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VEILING SUBSTANCE IN SEMANTICS:
THE KNOTTY STATE OF THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE
LAWRENCE PONOROFF*
ABSTRACT

Conflicting social philosophies with their infinite variations will
inevitably influence law making and law interpretation.Consciously or
unconsciously, social and political attitudesaffect even those concerned
with such an apparently technical matter as the definition of preferential transfer in bankruptcy. As it evolved over time from its English
law antecedents, the law of preferential transfers in the United States
graduallyshifted its concern from the culpability of commercial actors
to the effect of the transfer on distributiveequality goals, culminating
in our current law of preferences as codified in the federal Bankruptcy
Code. While crafted in a highly technical and formalistic fashion, the
black-letter law is simply incapable of capturing all of the nuances of
behavior in the credit marketplace. Therefore, the need has remained
for the bankruptcy courts to put their gloss on the statute to ensure it
serves its intendedpurposes in any given case and also as a system. One
prominent example of this judicial explication is what's known as
the earmarking doctrine, a court-made equitable invention intended
to assure that the transfer under scrutiny truly involves property of
the debtor, as opposed to circumstanceswhere the debtor serves merely
as a conduit to move funds from one creditor to another. Although its
existence has been recognized almost without exception, courts, and for
that matter commentators, disagree sharply over the circumstances
when it is appropriatefor the doctrine to be invoked and, even when
there is agreement about those circumstances, similar disagreement
over the standard to apply in determining if the transfer at issue is
actually protected under the earmarking exception. This Article
attempts to address both of these questions by proposing a fluid
approach to defining the scope of the earmarking doctrine that
conforms its application to what is asserted to be the foundational
purpose of the preference law; namely, ratable distribution among
creditors with similar rights.
"The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal."**
* Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Michigan State University College of Law.
** This is an oft-cited paraphrase for Aristotle's statement that "For instance, it is
thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who
are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is, though not for everybody, but for those who are unequal" in ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. III., at V. 8 (H. Rackham
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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the core policies underlying the federal bankruptcy law' is
"equality of distribution" among similarly-positioned creditors;2 the
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1932) (c. 400-300 B.C.E.). Obviously, no believer in
equality among people not of equal status, Aristotle's sentiment translates nicely to the
bankruptcy law's emphasis of equal treatment among common claimants.
1. References in this Article to the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code" are to the current
law of bankruptcy, which is found in Title 11 of the United States Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011532 (2012). It was enacted on Nov. 6, 1978, as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, (the "1978 Act"), and governs all cases filed on or after Oct. 1,
1979.
2. See generally Slobodian v. U.S. ex rel. I.R.S., 533 B.R. 126 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (describing equality of distribution as a central policy of the Bankruptcy Code) (citing In re Kiwi Int'l
Air Lines, Inc., 344 F.3d 311, 316 (3d. Cir. 2003). See also Howard C. Buschman III, Benefits
and Burdens: Post-PetitionPerformance of Unassumed Executory Contracts, 5 BANKR. DEv.
J. 341, 341 (1988) (describing the similar treatment of like creditors as a fundamental tenet
of bankruptcy law); David G. Epstein, Casey Ariail & David M. Smith, Not Just Anna Nicole
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3
concept is frequently captured in the adage equity is equality."
Its influence can be observed in several provisions of the federal
Bankruptcy Code. 4 This objective is most prominently featured in
the Code's scheme for defining voidable preferences.5 Although the

Smith: Cleavage in Bankruptcy, 31 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 15, 15 (2014) (criticizing the favored treatment given to vendors and lessors as inconsistent with the key policy of equality
of distribution among similarly-situated creditors); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain,91 YALE L. J. 857, 857 (1982) (noting
that while bankruptcy is usually thought of as a procedure for providing relief to an overburdened debtor, in fact, most of the bankruptcy process is concerned with creditor-distribution questions); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (describing equality of distribution as the theme of the former bankruptcy law).
3. See, e.g., Centergas, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 172 B.R. 844, 853-54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1994) (noting that prior bankruptcy law and the Code codified this maxim, which derives
from Roman Law); see also Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1454 (2012) (noting that bankruptcy policy is built around
the distributional norm that "similar creditors should have similar recoveries"); Lawrence
Ponoroff, Evil Intentions and an Irresolute Endorsement for Scientific Rationalism:Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1439, 1447 (1993) (hereinafter "Evil
Intentions") ("Bankruptcy law must regulate preferences precisely because preferential
transfers belie the bankruptcy maxim that 'equality is equity."'); Kenneth N. Klee, Tithing
and Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 157 (2001) ("If the Bankruptcy Code were a Country and Western song, its refrain would be 'Equity is Equality.' At its core, the bankruptcy
system embodies the principle that creditors with similar rights are treated equally.").
4. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2012) (providing that, the rights of secured creditors
and priority creditors aside, all general creditors of the debtor take paripassu); 11 U.S.C. §§
547-51 (2012) (collecting trustee's avoiding powers); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4) (2012)
(grouping "substantially similar" claims for similar treatment in Chapter 11 plans); 11
U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3), (b)(1) (2012) (requiring that a Chapter 13 plan that classifies claims
must provide equal treatment for each claim within the class and may not discriminate unfairly against or among any class or classes). Of course, bankruptcy policy must be reconciled
with other social policies with which it competes. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
The vindication of those other policies will, from time-to-time, result in unequal treatment
among like claims. A prime example of this disparate treatment can be found in the Code's
scheme for awarding priority to certain unsecured claims in order, in each case, to advance
a competing policy interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012). Correspondingly, § 510(c) gives
the bankruptcy courts license to demote an otherwise equal claim when necessary to redress
inequitable conduct. See generally Alec P. Ostrow, The Animal Farm of Administrative Insolvency, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 339 (2003) (detailing various contexts in which the
Code elevates the priority of certain claims).
5. The definition of a preference can be found in § 547(b) of the Code. See infra notes
53-55 and accompanying text. The fear is that "[i]f preference law fails to preserve absolute
equality in liquidation, those creditors who are aware of this failure will compete for position
during insolvency rather than cooperating fully in an attempt to maximize the value of the
firm." Note, PreferentialTransfers and the Value of the Insolvent Firm, 87 YALE L.J. 1449,
1455 (1978); see also Ramco/Fitzsimmons Steel Co., Inc. v. Raritan River Steel Co., 95 B.R.
299, 301 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1988) ("The laws relating to preferences were intended to avoid
payments . . . to creditors on the eve of bankruptcy on antecedent debt, which payments or
transfers have the effect of preferring those creditors over other creditors similarly situated
but unpaid. They have been described as deterrents to grab law tactics and have as their
purpose promoting the policy of equality of distribution among creditors of insolvent debtors."); JAMES ANGELL MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 283 (1956) (ob-

serving that "[t]he law of preference is the most significant contribution of bankruptcy to
commercial law...").
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legislative history of the Code suggests there are two principal
justifications for the preference statute, 6 I have argued in other
contexts that the deterrence explanation for the preference law is
chimerical, and equality should be the predominant purposive object
driving the interpretation and application of contemporary preference
law. 7
6.

The House Committee Report that accompanied the Bankruptcy Reform Act of

1978, provided as follows:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way out

of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors. Second, and
more important, the preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality
of distribution among creditors of the debtor. . . . The operation of the preference section to

deter "the race of diligence" of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers
the second goal of the preference section-that of equality of distribution.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977).
7.

See Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences:RecalcitrantPassengersAboard the

Flight From Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 368 (2016) (hereinafter "FlightFrom Equality"); Ponoroff, Evil Intentions, supra note 3, at 1439. That said, I am not the only one, and

certainly not the first, to champion equality as the dominant policy to be served by the preference law. See generally Lissa L. Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, 1987 DUKE L.J. 78, 115 (1987) (identifying preservation of equality as the main goal of the preference law since 1978, with deterrence playing only an incidental role); David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable PreferentialLaw, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 215-18 (1995) (identifying several reasons that raise serious doubt over whether deterrence is the principal purpose of
voidable preference law); Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 748 (1985) (suggesting that, despite the legislative history
discussing the aim of "deterring creditors from scrambling for advantage, it seems ridiculous
to expect [the preference law to produce] deterrence...."); Rafael I. Pardo, On Proofof Preferential Effect, 55 ALA. L. REV. 281, 282 (2004) (opining that while Congress identified deterrence and the equality principle as the twin purposes of the preference provision, the latter should be viewed as primary); Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. L.
REV. 981, 1029 (1992); Note, supra note 5, at 1459 (proposing the hegemony of equality in
enforcement of the preference law). Cf. Brook E. Gotberg, ConflictingPreferences in Business

Bankruptcy: The Need for Different Rules in Different Cases, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 59, 65
(2014) (noting that the policy of deterrence conflicts with the policy of equal distribution.);
John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA.
L. REV. 249, 262-64 (1981) (identifying several reasons that raise serious doubt over whether
deterrence is the principal purpose of voidable preference law, but also questioning whether
there are sufficient preference recaptures to warrant the assertion that preference law actually ameliorates distributional equalities). See also infra text accompanying notes 63-65.

It should also be noted that, in significant measure, the exceptions to preference liability in
§ 547(c) (see infra note 11), highlight the fact that the normative justification for the preference law remains in some measure about "deterrence" as well as equality. See infra note 8.

This is particularly true of the all-important ordinary course of business exception in subsection (c)(2). See Tabb, supra note 7, at 1016-27 (describing section 547(c)(2) as irreconcilably at odds with proper basis for preference liability and advocating for its repeal). Professor
Countryman was of the same mind. Countryman, supranote 7, at 817-18; see also Ponoroff,
Evil Intentions, supra note 3, at 1481 n.119 and accompanying text (noting that "[i]t would

2019]

VEILING SUBSTANCE IN SEMANTICS

341

8
Operating from that foundational premise, the restrictive
approach taken by some courts' as to the minimum factual
circumstances under which the earmarking doctrine might be
wielded as a mechanism for sidestepping preference liability is a
disturbing one in that it elevates form over substance in a manner
not compelled by the letter of the statute and in stark transgression
with legislative purpose. Even among courts that accord the doctrine
a more expansive interpretation, there is considerable confusion
and disagreement over the standard that should be employed in
deciding if a sufficient showing has been made to warrant application
of the earmarking doctrine as a valid defense to a trustee's preference
challenge.10
Although not one of the prescribed statutory defenses to preference
liability," the earmarking doctrine has long been recognized as a
judicially-created exception to what otherwise would technically
qualify preference.1' It derives from a pragmatic interpretation of the
perambulatory language in § 547(b) that the transfer must be of "an
interest of the debtor in property" in order for preference liability to

be difficult and perhaps unfair to disassociate completely the scheme of preference exceptions in section 547(c) from the sentiment that these transactions do not involve the sort [of]
deliberate 'eve of bankruptcy' grab which colored earlier preference law" and identifying section 547(c)(2) as the most direct expression of that sentiment.).
8. In fairness, it should be observed that not all agree with dubbing "equality" as the
dominant policy consideration animating the preference law. E.g., Daniel J. Bussel, The
Problem with Preferences, 100 IOwA L. REV. BULL. 11, 14 (2014) ("[T]he interest in ratable
distribution alone is insufficient to warrant avoidance in at least some situations involving
innocent transferees."); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
125-28 (1986) (adopting the position that the justifications for the preference law are to prevent dismantling of the bankruptcy estate and in order to assure that no creditor is able to
unilaterally opt-out of the hypothetical creditor's bargain model that Jackson posits creditors, as risk-neutral wealth maximizers, would agree to ex ante to assure that the law oper-

ates as efficiently as possible). Jackson's view is perhaps the strongest endorsement of a
deterrence-based rationale for crafting the preference law. More recently, Professor Skeel
has provocatively asserted that the equality norm no longer plays a dominant role in presentday bankruptcy law, and that continued attention on equality draws attention away from

the real normative issues and concerns in play in twenty-first-century preference law. David
A. Skeel Jr., The Empty Idea of "Equalityof Creditors," 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 700-02 (2018).
9. See infra Section III.A.1.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 191-202.
11. These defenses, or exceptions, to preference liability are collected in subsection (c)
of § 547. There are currently nine defenses as well as an additional defense contained in
subsection (h) that was added to the Code by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 201, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
12. The statutory elements of an avoidable preference are listed in § 547(b) of the Code.
See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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'

attach.1 3 Specifically, where the property transferred by the debtor de
jure, albeit perhaps not de facto, belongs to a party other than the
debtor, the earmarking doctrine allows substance to prevail over form
by providing the recipient of the alleged preferential transfer with a
defense.1 4 The rationale is that if the transfer involves assets of a third
party, then it does not deprive the later-to-be-formed bankruptcy
estate of resources that would otherwise be available to satisfy claims
of unsecured creditors as a group. 1
Equitable in nature, 6 the earmarking doctrine moderates the
literal application of the elements of a voidable preference in circumstances where the transfer at issue has no actual preferential effect;
i.e., it does not transgress the distributional aims of the bankruptcy
law.' 7 The most prosaic example occurs where a third party extends
credit to the debtor to permit the payoff of a specific debt and
effectively limits the use of those funds to that purpose and that
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012); see also infra Section II. The earmarking doctrine has
also been pressed into service to determine whether the funds are property of the debtor for
purposes of establishing a fraudulent transfer under § 548(a) of the Code. See, e.g., Kapila v.
Espirito Santo Bank (In re Bankest Cap. Corp), 374 B.R. 333, 338-39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007)
(indicating that in determining whether money is property of the debtor for fraudulent transfer purposes, the operative question is whether the funds came under the debtor's dominion
and control); see also Sherman v. TBK Bank (In re Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.), No. 173086, 2018 WL 4348049 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., Sept. 7, 2018) (involving both a preference and a
fraudulent transfer challenge).
14. See generally Cage v. Wyo-Ben, Inc. (In re Ramba), 437 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2006)
(noting that there cannot be a preference if the debtor has no equitable interest in the property transferred (citing McCord v. Agard (In re Bean), 252 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2001); Adams v. Anderson (In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co.), 223 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2000)
(suggesting that in determining whether property that is transferred belongs to the debtor
for purposes of § 547, the court should consider whether the transfer to the favored creditor
reduces the funds to which other creditors of the same class can resort for the payment of
their debts); Jenkins v. Chase Home Mortg. Corp. (In re Maple Mortg., Inc.), 81 F.3d 592,
595 (5th Cir. 1996) ("If funds cannot be used to pay the debtor's creditors, then they generally
are not deemed an asset of the debtor's estate for preference purposes."); Sherman v. TBK
Bank (In re Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.), No.17-3086, 2018 WL 4348049 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex., Sept. 7, 2018) (describing the objective to be served by application of the earmarking
doctrine as intending to assure that substance prevails over form); see also Smith v. Suarez

(In re IFS Fin. Corp.), 417 B.R. 419, 435-36 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009), aff'd, 669 F.3d 255 (5th
Cir. 2012) ("The earmarking doctrine is widely accepted in the bankruptcy courts as a valid
defense against a preference claim, primarily because the assets from the third party were
never in the control of the debtor and therefore payment of these assets to a creditor in no
way diminishes the debtor's estate.").
15. See Ganis Credit Corp. v. Anderson (In re Jan Weilert RV, Inc.), 315 F.3d 1192, 1199
(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Superior Stamp, 223 F.3d at 1008) ("The principal rationales supporting the earmarking doctrine are (1) the transferred funds were not property of the debtor,
and (2) there was no diminution of the bankruptcy estate....").
16. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Luker v. Lewis Auto Glass, Inc. (In re Francis), 252 B.R. 143, 145 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2000) (explaining the rationale for the doctrine as protecting from preference recovery a payment that does not diminish the estate).
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purpose only. The consequence is that the new lender has essentially
refinanced the existing obligation, such that, from the perspective of
the debtor, the new lender is simply substituted for the creditor whose
debt was retired. 18 Other creditors are not affected by the transaction
inasmuch as the pool of assets available for distribution on their
claims is no greater but also no less than it was prior to the transfer.
Functionally, what has transpired is identical in substance to a direct
purchase by, and assignment of the original creditor's claim to, the new
creditor. Otherwise, the status quo has been preserved. All that has
changed is the identity of one of the debtor's creditors, but neither
the total number of debts owed by the debtor nor the total number of
19
creditors asserting a claim against the debtor's assets is affected.
A less prosaic, and far more consequential, illustration of an
attempt to shield a payment from recovery as a preferential transfer
can be found in the recent bankruptcy court opinion in In re WB
Services, LLC.20 The decision arose out of a construction contract
between the property owner and its general contractor, who later filed
a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The rather unique nature of construction

18. One caveat here is that the loan from the new creditor must also be unsecured. If
the new debt is secured, and the security interest unavoidable, then there is a transfer of an
interest in the debtor's property; i.e., the collateral, which then does result in a diminution
of the estate that is prejudicial to other general creditors. See D.A.N. Joint Venture, L.P. v.
Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2007) (pointing out that an important limitation on the earmarking doctrine is that a new loan must be unsecured and, if
not, the payment to the old creditor is voidable to the extent of the collateral transferred by
the debtor); Taunt v. Fid. Bank of Mich. (In re Royal Golf Products Corp.), 908 F.2d 91, 94
(6th Cir.1990) (stating that payment to creditor with funds supplied by a third party will
constitute a preference to the extent of the value of any security granted to the third party)
(citing Mandross v. Peoples Banking Co. (In re Hartley), 825 F.2d 1067, 1071 (6th Cir.1990));
Brown v, Mt. Prospect State Bank (In re Muncrief), 900 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1990)
(same); Buffalo Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Omega Tool Corp., 344 B.R. 394, 401 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 2006) (observing that where a security interest is given by the debtor to the new creditor
in order to receive the earmarked funds, more than the mere substitution of unsecured

creditors has occurred); Ledford v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Belme), 76 B.R. 121, 122 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1987) (stating that "unconditional adherence to the general rule of the earmarking
doctrine is inappropriate where a secured creditor is substituted for an unsecured creditor,
[and] a if third-party lender is granted a security interest in debtor's property as part of an
'earmarking' transaction, the court must focus on whether the transfer diminished the value
of the debtor's estate") (citing Matter of Villars, 35 B.R. 868, 872 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
19. See generally McLemore v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville (In re Montgomery), 983
F.2d 1389, 1395 (6th Cir. 1993) (explaining that the discharge of an existing debt with newly
borrowed funds designated for that purpose has been held not to be a transfer of property of
the debtor even if the funds pass through the debtor on their way to the old creditor). For
other good explanations and analyses concerning the applicability of the earmarking doctrine to a preference action, see Gray v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Neponset River Paper Co.),
231 B.R. 829, 833-35 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999); Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R.
682, 700-03 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2014); Official Bondholders Comm. v. E. Util. Assocs. (In re
EUA Power Corp.), 147 B.R. 634, 639-40 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992).
20. Davis v. Kice Indus., Inc. (In re WB Servs.), 587 B.R. 548, 561 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2018).
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industry contracting presents several challenges insofar as application
of the Bankruptcy Code is concerned.21 This is a product of the fact
that, typically, much of the general contractor's work is done by and
through third-party subcontractors and suppliers. Under state law,
these parties, while not in direct privity, retain certain lien rights
against the owner's property if amounts contractually due them from
the general contractor go unpaid.22 To protect themselves, owners will
resort to several approaches, including use of joint-payee checks, to
assure that payments due subcontractors and suppliers are made and,
thus, liens against their property are avoided. 3
This is what occurred in WB Services. At some point during the
project, the owner became concerned about timely payment of
subcontractors. As a result, it was agreed between the owner and the
general contractor that future payments from the former to the later
would be made in the form of checks made payable jointly to the
general contractor and specific subcontractors, including the defendant, Kice Industries.2 4 Under this arrangement, the owner issued a
check for $118,191.35 payable to the general contractor and Kice.
Per a prearranged procedure, the check was endorsed at the owner's
facility by a representative of the general contractor and then delivered to Kice in return for a lien waiver.25 Because the payment to
Kice was made within ninety days of the general contractor's subsequent bankruptcy filing, 2 6 the trustee in that case filed an action to
recover the payment as a preference.27 In response, Kice raised several
defenses, 28 including that the payment did not represent the transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property because it essentially had been
"earmarked" by the owner for Kice.29

21. See generally Lawrence Ponoroff, Construction Claims in Bankruptcy: Making the
Best of a Bad Situation, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 344 (1995) (noting that construction contracts
present unique problems in bankruptcy because of the "complex web of legal, contractual,

and financial arrangements characterizing most construction activities.").
22. Id. at 348-51.
23. See id. at 380-82.
24. WB Servs., 587 B.R. at 553.
25. Id. at 553. For reasons not explained, the lien waivers actually covered only
$82,661.35 of the $118,191.35 payment. Id.
26. This is one of the elements of a preference set forth in Code § 547(b). See also infra
text accompanying notes 53-55.
27. WB Seros., 587 B.R. at 553.
28. The court catalogued these defenses as: (1) "the payment was [not the] transfer an
interest of the debtor in property", (2) the transfer "did not diminish the bankruptcy estate",
and (3) that the transfer was part of a substantially contemporaneous exchange of new value
within the meaning of § 547(c)(1). Id. at 554.
29. Id. The first two of the above-listed defenses are, of course, simply alternative ways
of expressing the earmarking doctrine.
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The court began its analysis by citing approvingly from the
statement in a leading bankruptcy law treatise that, because the
earmarking doctrine is a judicially-created exception to preference
recovery, it should be narrowly construed. 30 The court also referenced
a Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision following a line
of cases that adopt a conservative slant on the earmarking doctrine,
limiting its application to situations where the new creditor is a
codebtor on the original obligation.3 1 While acknowledging that the
Tenth Circuit itself had not yet ruled on whether the doctrine should
be so limited,3 the court nonetheless concluded that, because the
owner was not a guarantor of the debtor's obligation and did not
extend credit to the general contractor with the requirement that the
funds be used to pay Kice, the joint-payee check was not shielded from
33
recovery as a preference under the earmarking doctrine or otherwise.
Treating them as separate arguments, the court also rejected Kice's
contentions that the general contractor had no independent obligation
to pay Kice, 34 and that the general contractor/debtor's lack of possession of the transferred funds denuded it of an interest in the property."
30. Id. at 556-57 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 547.03[2] [a] at 21-22 (16th Ed.
2018)). See also Motors Liquidation Avoidance Action Tr. v. JPMorgan Chase-Bank (In re
Motors Liquidation Co.), 596 B.R. 774, 781 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (same).
31. Davis v. Kice Indus. (In re WB Servs., LLC), 587 B.R. 548, 556-57 (Bankr. D. Kan.
2018). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision referred to was Manchester v. First Bank
& Tr. Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008). Manchester is discussed in
much more detail infra text accompanying notes 112-114.
32. WB Servs., 587 B.R. at 557-58. The court did discuss at some length the Tenth Circuit's decision in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Christiansen Bros., Inc. (In re Davidson), 66 F.3d
1560 (10th Cir. 1995), a case in which Kice heavily placed reliance in support of its earmarking exception argument. The court, however, found Davidson distinguishable both because

it involved a post-petition transfer and not a preference, and also because in Davidson, unlike the current case, the debtor had an independent legal (contractual) obligation to pay
suppliers and subcontractors. See WB Serus., 587 B.R. at 560.
33. Id. at 560, 563 (concluding that Kice failed to meet its burden of showing the debtor
did not have an interest in the property transferred and therefore, the payment was not a
preference). In reaching this result, the court relied on the reasoning expressed in Code Electric, Inc. v. Crampton, 197 B.R. 807 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) and Napolitano v. Vibra-Conn,
Inc. (In re R.J. Patton Co., Inc.), 348 B.R. 618 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2006). WB Servs., 587 B.R.
at 559-61.
34. WB Servs., 587 B.R. at 560-62. Kice's argument was that, under the independent
obligation doctrine, the funds constituting the payment could not have been property of the
estate. See supra note 32. In this case, there was no obligation other than the debtor's general
contractual obligation. Id. at 560-61.
35. Id. at 561-562. This factor-lack of possession of the funds-is often regarded as an
element or factor in the earmarking analysis. See, e.g., U. S. Lines, Inc. v. United States (In
re McLean Indus., Inc.), 162 B.R. 410, 420-21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,
30 F.3d 385 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that because the debtor had come into possession of and
had control over the funds in question, the earmarking doctrine could not apply). However,
there is no clear consensus on the point in the decisional law. See infra note 203.
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This Article advances the view that the approach to the earmarking
doctrine taken in WB Services is unduly and needlessly constraining.
More specifically, this narrow construction of the doctrine serves no
particular bankruptcy purpose or end and is not necessarily required
in order to avoid prejudice to a codebtor on the obligation retired in
the form of potentially having to pay the obligation twice.36 Even more
perplexing, this approach overlooks the fact that it is not just codebtors
who may be negatively affected beyond return of the amount of a
preferential transfer unless shielded by the earmarking doctrine.37 At
the same time, an underinclusive construction of the earmarking
defense also provides an unearned benefit to other creditors in the
form of an artificial increase in the size of the estate.35 In each of these
The court also found that § 547(b)(5)'s "greater amount" test (see infra note 55 and accompanying text) was satisfied because Kice received 100 percent of its claim rather than the lesser
amount it would have received as an unsecured greater in the general contractor's bankruptcy case. WB Seres., 587 B.R. at 562-63.
36. This is the oft-cited rationale for applying the earmarking doctrine in the codebtor
case, but not beyond. See WB Servs., 587 B.R. at 557-59. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 219-221, this rationale is suspect. Moreover, if it were a sound basis for recognizing
the exception then it should also apply where one party makes a payment (rather than a
loan) to the debtor with the expectation that the debtor would use the funds to pay a specific
indebtedness to a party that might have lien rights against the payor. However, in Buchwald
Capital Advisors LLC v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006), the attempt to invoke the earmarking doctrine as a defense on similar facts
was rejected because the funds did not come from a "new creditor." Cf. infra note 236 and
accompanying text.

37.

While the opinion in WB Servs. does not reveal the result of this case, it will be

recalled that Kice executed a lien waiver in return for the payment. 587 B.R. 548, 553. If
that payment must be restored to the estate as a preferential transfer, that waiver, which
ran in favor of a third party, arguably does not get restored, with the result that Kice would
be cut off from the other recourse under state law provided for suppliers and subcontractors.

The point being, the potential for inequity is not limited to codebtors (and may not even exist
in most codebtor cases). See infra text accompanying notes 219-221. Even in a non-construc-

tion contract situation, it is easy to imagine the creditor receiving payment materially changing its position in reliance on the payment between the date of receipt and the date of the
later preference action against it. This could make it extremely difficult or costly to unwind
for the transferee/creditor over and above the cost of returning the preferential transfer.
38. To illustrate, assume on the 90th day before filing the debtor has $100 in assets and
5 unsecured creditors each owed $100. Obviously, if nothing changes, each creditor will receive $20 in the bankruptcy case. But now assume new lender gives debtor, on the 45th day
prior to bankruptcy, $100 to payoff creditor #1, which is what happens. When the bankruptcy
case is filed, again, nothing has changed-the debtor has $100 to be split among five creditors
holding claims of $100 each. If, however, the trustee is able to recover the payment to creditor
#1 as a preference, now there will $200 in assets to be shared among six creditors each with
a claim of $100. The result is a dividend to each creditor of $33.33. This ignores, of course,
administrative costs associated with recovering the preference. The point, however, is that
the purpose of the preference law is to prevent a diminution of the estate and not specifically
to augment it. See Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R. 682, 697 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 2014) ("[T]he test of whether a preference has occurred is not what the creditor receives,
but what the bankrupt's estate has lost, because it is the diminution of the bankrupt's estate,
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respects, limiting the earmarking defense to the codebtor scenario
contravenes the conjoined principles of ratable distribution and asset
maximization that are supposed to animate the bankruptcy law in the
first place. 39
To support this argument, Part I of this Article begins by reviewing,
at a very high level of generality, the evolution of voidable preferences
in the bankruptcy law. Part II then traces the origins of the earmarking doctrine as a non-statutory exception to preference liability.
Part III surveys the division in the case law over the scope of the
earmarking doctrine. Next, Part IV examines the extent of the
bankruptcy courts' equitable authority-the jurisdictional foundation
upon which the earmarking doctrine rests-in light of recent efforts
by the Supreme Court to rein in that authority. Part V critiques the
trend in the decisional law, as illustrated by WB Services, to abandon
a diminution of the estate perspective in applying the earmarking
doctrine in favor of more confining standards that are tied either
to digressive concerns bearing on the status of the new creditor or
hyper-technical worries over the debtor's "control" over the earmarked
funds. Following this, Part VI, proposes an alternative blueprint
for deciding when to invoke the earmarking doctrine, which, it is
submitted, corresponds more closely with the principal policy considerations that have come to define contemporary preference law.
Lastly, this Part also addresses why the boundaries established by the
Supreme Court on the scope of bankruptcy courts' equitable powers
preclude extension of this new approach in a related factual context
where the earmarking defense has been raised and might otherwise
have had more than a modicum of relevance.
II. PREFERENCE DOCTRINE AND POLICY

There are several fine treatments in the literature detailing the
long and somewhat ambivalent history of voidable preferences under
not the unequal payment to creditors, which is the evil sought to be remedied by the avoidance of a preferential transfer.") (citing Va. Nat'l Bank v. Woodson (In re Decker), 329 F.2d
836, 840 (4th Cir.1964)).
39. The two principles go hand-in-hand. As explained by Tom Jackson, bankruptcy operates to force creditors to put aside their individual interests in return for receiving a ratable share of a larger pie. JACKSON, supra note 8, at 10-19. In effect, the Chapter 7 debtor
purchases a discharge from further legal obligation on prepetition debts by surrendering all
of his or her unencumbered, nonexempt assets, which are then liquidated in an orderly manner with a view toward maximizing value for unsecured creditors as a group. See also Eliza-

beth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785 (1987) ("In bankruptcy, with
an inadequate pie to divide and the looming discharge of unpaid debts, the disputes center
on who is entitled to shares of the debtor's assets and how these shares are to be divided.

Distribution among creditors is not incidental to other concerns; it is the center of the bankruptcy scheme.").
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both English and American bankruptcy law.40 There is, therefore, no
need to plough the same ground here, other than to observe that, by
the time the current Bankruptcy Code was enacted, preference law
had for the most part lost its prior association with culpability and
state of mind.41 The theory of contemporary preference legislation
is largely we need not engage in any intense scrutiny to ferret out
the underlying intentions of debtors and creditors as commercial
citizens.42 Rather, preference law has evolved into a kind of no-fault
liability offense.43
That is to say, over time we have achieved a consensus, even if only
a wobbly one,4 that certain transactions undermine the trustee's ability to assure ratable distribution and obstruct the efficient production
of commercial credit in a manner that requires redress if the goals of

40. In his comprehensive treatment of the subject, Professor Weisberg stated, "Preference law has remained one of the most unstable categories of bankruptcy jurisprudence.
Indeed, its instability is obvious in the most recent, and perhaps most scientifically pretentious, efforts at legislating an American preference law, efforts that have been quickly undermined by the courts and then by Congress itself." Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality,
the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4
(1986). See also Countryman, supra note 7, at 714-25; McCoid, supra note 7, at 250-59;
Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In Defense of the Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration
of the PreferenceRules Affecting Commercial Financing, 61 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 5-9 (1983). See
also Skeel, supra note 8, at 704-09 (recounting the equality among creditors norm in American bankruptcy law, including the preference provision).
41. See Countryman, supra note 7, at 725 (pointing out that "for the last forty years
under the old Act, the debtor's state of mind was of no concern in establishing voidable preferences . . . [F]or the entire history of the old Act, a trustee . . . had to prove something about

the state of mind of the transferee-creditor"); McCoid, supra note 7, at 259 ("Preference law
has thus moved from a notion of debtor fraud to [under the 1978 Act] a standard of absolute
liability....").
42. See Ponoroff, Evil Intentions, supra note 3, at 1478 (pointing out that, "until adoption of the present Bankruptcy Code in 1978, every version of American bankruptcy legislation embodied some notion of 'culpability' among the essential elements of a preferential
transfer."). See infra note 48.

43. Southmark Corp. v. Grosz (In re Southmark Corp.), 49 F.3d 1111, 1116 n.11 (5th
Cir. 1995) ("[t]he purpose of the transfer is not dispositive of the question whether it qualifies
as an avoidable preference under section 547(b) because 'it is the effect of the transaction,
rather than the debtor's or creditor's intent, that is controlling.' ") (citing T.B. Westex Foods,
Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re T.B. Westex Foods, Inc.), 950 F.2d 1187, 1195 (5th Cir.
1992) (emphasis in original)). See also Tabb, supra note 7, at 1035 ("suggest[ing] that the
true nature of preference law should be seen as akin to strict liability").
44. See Weisberg, supra note 40, at 5 (observing that "[b]ankruptcy law has been playing out a ritualized dance between formal legislative rules and normative commercial and
moral standards for 500 years" and will continue to do so until some consensus is reached
over essential purposes of a bankruptcy regime within the framework of our larger credit
economy). But see Skeel, supra note 8, at 720-21 (discussing the intrusion on the equality
norm created largely by the ordinary course of business exception to preference liability).
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45
a collectivist debt collection proceeding are to be achieved. When this
occurs, the transaction must be unwound regardless of the innocence
vel non of the participants. 46 It is why the preference law has no serious
analog under state law, where, in direct contrast to bankruptcy policy,
the debt-collection ethos is one of competition and awarding the spoils
to the creditors that are first to arrive on the scene and thus, able to
pounce most swiftly.47
Accordingly, the elements of a voidable preference in § 547(b) are
drawn in a formalistic fashion that impersonally prescribe certain
classes of transactions that occur on the eve of bankruptcy, or, in
the case of creditors with inside knowledge of the debtor's financial
situation, even longer. 48 The requirement that the transfer occur
within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing-in the case of noninsiders-is arbitrary. 49 It reflects an assumption that in the roughly
three months prior to filing, as the debtor's situation spirals downward
toward the inevitable end, there is a greater likelihood that payments

45. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6139
("To argue that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a preference and that
creditors should not be required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore
the strong bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors."); see also Buckley v. Jeld-Wen,
Inc. (In re Interior Wood Prods. Co.), 986 F.2d 228, 232 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that the intent
of the parties is not among the factors to be considered in determining if a transfer by the
debtor can be set aside as a preference).
46. See supra note 43.
47. See Susan Block-Lieb, Fishingin Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standardfor Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
337, 355-56 (1993) ("Pursuit of various state law remedies such as execution, attachment,
garnishment, levy, and the like may involve a 'race to the courthouse' by a debtor's creditors,
with the creditors who win the race entitled to 'grab' the debtor's assets away from the
debtor's slower creditors.").

48. The preference period for insiders, who are obviously more attuned to the debtor's
financial situation, is one year. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2012). As originally enacted, §
547 of the Code continued to require the trustee to establish that the defendant-creditor had
reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent" at the time of transfer in the limited
circumstance where the claim was being asserted against an "insider" (as defined in Bankruptcy Code § 101(30) and the transfer occurred during the extended insider preference period; i.e., more than 90 days before filing but within one year of the filing of the case. 11
U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(i)-(ii) (1982). This requirement was eliminated as part of the amendments to the Code accomplished under Title III to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
49. Under § 60a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 Act, Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549 (1978), the period was four months. While the prescribed length of the preference period
may be arbitrary, the need for some temporal limit on the preference claw-back is not. By
definition, preferences are disruptive of market transactions that, under non-bankruptcy
law, are perfectly lawful commercial arrangements. Subsequently upsetting them after the
fact undermines the policies of certainty and finality that commercial transactions depend
upon. See McCoid, supra note 7, at 267-68 (discussing the uncertainty costs imposed by a
creditors' realization that a particular payment received may have to be disgorged in the
event of a subsequent bankruptcy filing).
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or transfers that advantage one creditor over its compatriots will
occur. Rather than subject each such transfer to individualized
scrutiny to assess if improper ulterior motive existed, either on the
part of the debtor, the creditor, or both, the Code simply draws a line
in the sand and says from ninety days out to the moment of filing
any non-pro-rata transfers of property, or of an interest in property,5 0
of the debtor to unsecured creditors must be restored to the estate,5 1
absent a meritorious defense.52 In this fashion, the law enforces ex ante
a system of pro rata distribution.
Of course, it's a bit more nuanced than that simple explanation
might lead one to believe. That's where the other elements of § 547(b)
50. The broad definition of "transfer" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (2012), includes not only
the outright alienation of property (e.g., a payment), but also a conveyance of a portion of a
debtor's interest in property-less than all the sticks. Of course, the most common example

of the transfer of an interest in property is the granting to a creditor of a security interest in
the debtor's property.
51. In effect, § 547 operates to impose a sort of legal no-fly zone where the status quo
must be maintained insofar as transfers of the debtor's property are concerned in order to

preserve the assets available for ratable distribution to unsecured creditors. The statute is
clear that the trustee bears the burden of proof with respect to the elements of a voidable
preference, and the defendant bears the burden of establishing a valid defense under subsection (c). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (2012). Because the earmarking doctrine is extra-statutory
there is some disagreement over which party bears the burden of proof. As it is related to
one of the elements in 11 U.S.C.§ 547(b) (2012)-i.e., an interest of the debtor in propertyan argument can be made that the burden of proving the non-applicability of the doctrine
ought to be on the trustee. However, since the earmarking doctrine operates as a defense,
logically the defendant should bear the burden once the trustee makes a preliminary showing that the transfer was "of an interest of the debtor," and most courts agree. See Chase
Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 468 (6th Cir. 2008) (placing
the burden of proving the earmarking defense on the defendant); Schubert v. Lucent Tech.
Inc. (In re Winstar Commc'ns, Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 400-01 (3d Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit
has held, however, that "the trustee [has] the burden to prove the earmarking defense does
not apply." Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir.
1998). A hybrid approach was adopted by the court in FBI Wind Down Liquidating Tr. v. All
Am. Poly Corp. (In re FBI Wind Down, Inc.), 581 B.R. 116, 133 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) ("As
long as the Liquidating Trustee has proven its initial burden of showing an interest of the
debtor in property, the burden shifts to the Defendant to prove earmarking."); see also Cage
v. Wyo-Ben, Inc. (In re Ramba, Inc.), 437 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 2006) (indicating that the
"trustee bears the burden of proving that the debtor had an interest in the" property transferred); Stingley v. AlliedSignal, Inc. (In re Libby Int'l, Inc.), 247 B.R. 463, 467 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2000) (holding because the earmarking exception "is not strictly an affirmative defense
...

under which the defendant has the burden of proof' but rather is an element of the

trustee's proof under § 547(b)). But see Manty v. Miller & Homes, Inc. (In re Nation-Wide
Exch. Servs., Inc.), 291 B.R. 131,147 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003) (observing that the cases that
place the burden of proof on the trustee are not fully tenable as a matter of logic because, as
a practical matter, it "essentially requires the proponent of a case in chief to prove a compounded negative-that is, to frame up what would be necessary to defeat an element of its
own cause of action, by way of a transactional structure and sequence, and then to 'prove'

that it had not been so in reality."). Relatedly, if the doctrine is not an affirmative defense,
then it is not waived by failing to plead it in the answer to a preference action. See Metcalf
v. Golden (In re Adbox, Inc.), 488 F.3d 836, 842 (9th Cir. 2007).
52. See supra note 11.

2019]

VEILING SUBSTANCE IN SEMANTICS

351

(beyond transfer of an interest of the debtor in property) of a voidable
53
preference come into play; i.e., to or for the benefit of a creditor, while
54
insolvent , on account of an antecedent debt, and that meets the
greater amount test of § 547(b)(5). 5 Each of these elements serves
the equality explanation for the preference law. If the debtor is not
insolvent (or rendered so by the transfer), other creditors are not
disadvantaged by the transfer because there are still adequate fish
and loaves to go around. If the transfer at issue was not on account
of an antecedent debt, but rather in return for commensurate new
value,5 6 again the net effect is neutral insofar as other general
creditors are concerned.5 7 Finally, if the greater amount test (which
requires the transferee-creditor to have received more due to the
transfer than it would have received in a hypothetical liquidation
under Chapter 7 of the Code in which the transfer did not occur) is
not satisfied, then there is likewise no preference. 8 For example, a
transfer to a fully-secured creditor will never meet the greater amount
test because, by definition, there is a pro tanto return of value to
the estate for each dollar paid in the form of release of collateral from
the secured creditor's priority lien, and those dollars are now available
for distribution to general unsecured creditors.5 9
53. See infra text accompanying notes 247-51.
54. Insolvency is presumed during the non-insider preference period. See 11 U.S.C. §
547(f) (2012). Under the definition in Code § 101(32), insolvency is defined in the balancesheet sense of liabilities in excess of assets at fair market value. This presumption serves to
shift the burden of production to the defendant, but not the burden of proof, which remains
on the trustee. See Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 34 (2d
Cir. 1996).
55. The greater amount test focuses on whether the transferee is better off due to the
transfer than it would have been had the transfer not been made and the debtor's estate
liquidated under Chapter 7. See infra text accompanying note 58. See generally Schoenmann
v. Bank of the W. (In re Tenderloin Health), 849 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2017). It is not
necessary to establish a diminution of the debtor's assets to prove whether the "greater
amounts test" is satisfied. See infratext accompanying note 263. This is why, in an earmarking situation the creditor receiving the payment may (indeed usually will) be better off, but
there may still be no preference because there has been no depletion of the assets available
for distribution to unsecured creditors. See supranote 38.

56. "New value" is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (2012).
57. Professor Countryman has described the greater amount test of § 547(b)(5) as an
extension of the diminution of the estate doctrine widely adhered to under the Bankruptcy
Act. See Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy Preferences-CurrentLaw and Proposed Changes,

11 U.C.C. L.J. 95, 99 (1978). But see infra note 263.
58. "A preference is a transfer that enables a creditor to receive payment of a greater
percentage of his claim . . . than he would have received if the transfer had not been made
and he had participated in the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt[cy] estate." H.R.
REP. No. 95-595 at 177, (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6139.
59. E.g. Brown v. Mt. Prospect State Bank (In re Muncrief), 900 F.2d 1220, 1224 n.4
(8th Cir.1990) (earmarking defense will not apply where a security interest is granted for
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Stepping back a pace from the formal language of the Code in

§ 547(b) and imagining, in metaphoric terms, what it describes from
the perspective of deeply-rooted bankruptcy policy, the image that
emerges is that of a piggy bank containing a fixed number of coins
(all of the same value) as of the beginning of the applicable preference
period. Applying the bankruptcy rule of pro rata distribution to
similarly-positioned (i.e., unsecured) creditors, if the diversion of the
coins transferred to the recipient-creditor during the preference period
has the effect of reducing the number of coins available for distribution
among all other unsecured creditors beyond the amount of the
transferee's ratable share, 60 then a preference has occurred that may
be avoided and, if applicable, recovered by the estate. 61 Stated another
way, in that circumstance, the transfer has resulted in an advantage
to the preferred creditor at the expense of other creditors with similar
rights, thus undermining the ideation of equity inter se that the Code
seeks to assure.

2

Juxtaposed against this account of preference theory, the deterrence explanation for the preference law fails to provide a satisfying
or adequate justification that might prove helpful in crafting sound

funds used to retire an unsecured debt); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of 360 Networks (USA) Inc. v. AAF-McQuay, Inc. (In re 360 Networks (USA) Inc.), 327 B.R. 187, 190
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (opining that a transfer to a fully-secured creditor will not be regarded as preferential); Marlow v. Rollins Cotton Co. (In re Julien Co.), 168 B.R. 647, 659
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1994) (describing the operation of the requirement in § 547(b)(5) that
the creditor "receivel more" as a result of the challenged transfer than it would have received
in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation on the basis that a payment to a fully-secured creditor does not diminish the estate). By contrast, if the claim is undersecured, the payment will
be preferential to the extent of the difference between the amount of the indebtedness and
the value of the collateral. This is due to the bankruptcy treatment of partially secured
claims in § 506(a), providing that a claim is secured only to the extent of the value of the
collateral. See generally Rice v. M-Real Estate (In re Turner Grain Merch.), 595 B.R. 295,
305-06 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2018) (explaining the difference for purposes of § 547(b)(5) of
whether the claim is secured, unsecured, or partially secured). As a practical matter, the
only other time the test will not be satisfied is in the case where the debtor's creditors would
be paid 100 cents on the dollar in the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.
60. This is the diminution doctrine that is central to preference analysis. Weisfelner v.
NAG Invests. LLC (In re Lyondell Chem. Co.), 567 B.R. 55, 119 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) ("Under the diminution of the estate test, a debtor's transfer of property constitutes a transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property [for purposes of preference claim] if it deprives the bankruptcy estate of resources which would otherwise have been used to satisfy the claims of
creditors.") (quoting Parks v. FIA Card Servs., N.A. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1256
(10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks removed).
61. In the case of a transfer in the form of an actual payment, upon avoidance, § 550(a)
authorizes the trustee to recovery the property transferred or its value. If the transfer was

of an interest in property (see supra note 50), the lien against the debtor's property will be
stripped off by avoidance so there is nothing further to recover.
62. See supra note 38 and infra note 221.
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3
and cogent responses to questions bearing on preference liability,1
such as the scope of the earmarking doctrine. Discouraging creditors
from racing to the courthouse to get ahead of their brethren only
promotes equality if a pin is stuck in the map on the ninetieth day
before filing for all to see. Then, presumably, creditors would
know that any further collection efforts would be at risk of being
unwound. However, the 90th day prior to the filing is, by definition,
unknown and not knowable until the actual date of filing; it is
always established retrospectively. The existence of the preference
law, therefore, is just as likely to encourage creditors to act at
the slightest sign of distress in order to get ahead of "the later to
be set" 90-day marker as they are to be deterred. Indeed, since
there is no penalty for accepting a preferential payment beyond its
return, there would be little downside to initiating collection efforts
even if a creditor knew its actions were occurring inside the preference
period. 64 At the same time, and perhaps even more troubling, a
deterrence explanation also revives the concept of mens rea back
into preference analysis in a fashion that can have and has had a
deleterious impact by expanding of the scope of the statutory
exceptions to preference liability in a manner that not only fails to
promote creditor equality but actually works against it, most notably
the ordinary course of business exception in § 547(c)(2). 65 In sum,

63. While the legislative history of the Code does refer to dual policies of equality and
deterrence to be served by the preference laws (supra note 6), it also indicates that a creditor's state of mind has nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of equality of distribution,
and whether or not he knows of the debtor's insolvency does little to comfort other creditors
similarly situated who will receive that much less from the debtor's estate as a result of the
prebankruptcy transfer to the preferred creditor. To argue that the creditor's state of mind
is an important element of a preference and that creditors should not be required to disgorge
what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bankruptcy policy of equality
among creditors. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6139.
64. See Countryman, supra note 7, at 748 (suggesting that, despite the legislative history discussing the aim of "deterring creditors from scrambling for advantage," it seems "ridiculous to expect [the preference law to produce] deterrence .... "); McCoid, supra note 7,
at 263-64 (offering reasons to be skeptical of preference law's deterrent effect); Tabb, supra
note 7, at 986-94 (discussing the primacy of the equality over deterrence explanation for the
preference law); see also Brook Gotberg, Optimal Deterrence and the Preference Gap, 2018
BYU L. REV. 559 (2018) (citing empirical evidence in support of the proposition that the preference law has little deterrent effect and, without much enthusiasm for the deterrence ra-

tionale, offering for perspective a set of legislative modifications that might result in achieving deterrence of the sort that Congress had in mind in 1978).
65. See Ponoroff, Flight From Equality, supra note 7, at 361-64 n.172 (describing §
547(c)(2) as the exception that threatens to undermine the equality explanation for the preference law by signaling that "innocence" should be a defense); see also Skeel, supra note 8,
at 720 (observing that "[m]uch of the leakage in current preference law can be traced to the
expansiveness of the safe harbor for payments made in the ordinary course of business.").
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deterrence, whatever role it may have played in the past, makes
little or no sense as a vitalizing principle supporting the inclusion of
preference liability in modern bankruptcy law.
III. THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE

The earmarking doctrine traces its origins as a judicially-created
exception to preference recovery back to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.66
The intellectual lineage of the doctrine can first be found in the
Supreme Court's opinion rendered in National Bank of Newport v.
National Herkimer County Bank,6 a case involving two corporations
under common management and, possibly, ownership. 68 In abbreviated form, the note of company #1 was issued to company #2 in
payment for supplies and then indorsed by company #2 to the defendant/bank in return for credit. 69 On September 26, 1903, company
#2 paid the note from its own funds and re-took possession of the
instrument.7 0 Company #2 then credited the amount of the payment to
a larger open-account debt owed by it to company #1.71 Within four
months of the payment to the bank, company #1 filed for bankruptcy
and the trustee challenged the payment as a voidable preference. 2
In particularizing the essence of a preferential transfer under § 60
of the 1898 Act, the Court explained that:
[i]t is not the mere form or method of the transaction that the act
condemns, but the appropriation by the insolvent debtor of a portion
of his property to the payment of a creditor's claim, so that thereby
the estate is depleted and the creditor obtains an advantage over
other creditors.7 3

While observing that cancellation of an account receivable of
the debtor is susceptible to being a preferential transfer, the Court
66. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter the "1898 Act"]; see also Adams
v. Anderson (In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co.), 223 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing the history of the earmarking doctrine); Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R.
682, 700-01 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2014 (same).
67. 225 U.S. 178 (1912).
68. Id. at 181 (noting that ownership interests were not apparent based on the record,
other than neither company held an equity position in the other, but management was
largely in the same hands).
69.

Id. at 181. Apparently, this arrangement was repeated on several occasions. Id. at

181-82.
70. Id. at 182.
71. Id. at 183.
72. Id. at 179, 183. As noted earlier, the preference period under the 1898 Act was four
months. See supra note 49.

73. Bank of Newport, 225 U.S. at 184.
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explained that, "unless the creditor takes by virtue of a disposition by
the insolvent debtor of his property for the creditor's benefit, so that
the estate of the debtor is thereby diminished, the creditor cannot
74
be charged with receiving a preference by transfer." The Court
continued that such a diminution of the estate did not occur in this
case because company #2 had standing, as an endorser of the note, to
satisfy the obligation, which is what in fact occurred.7 5 Therefore,
the Court concluded that, "[n] either directly nor indirectly was this
payment to the bank made by the [bankrupt company #1], and the
property of that company was not thereby depleted." 76 Notably, the
result hinged on the fact that company #2 could not legally treat the
payment as an allowable setoff against its debt to company #1 under
§ 68b of the Act. 7
In essence, company #2, as original payee of the note, was a creditor
of company #1. Upon indorsement and delivery of the note to the bank,
both companies became liable on the note to the bank. When the
note was reacquired by company #2, it was substituted for the bank as
obligee, but because the attempt to set off the payment against
amounts owed to company #1 by company #2 was not recognized, there

were neither fewer coins in the debtor's piggy bank as a result of the
payment to the bank nor greater claims in the aggregate against those
coins.
The situation where the new creditor is, for instance, a guarantor
differs from the situation where the new creditor is not a surety in
that there is an independent obligation owed by the surety to the old
creditor. Under the Code, prior to a payment from a guarantor, the

74. Id. at 184-85 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 185. Of note, however, while this was certainly true of company #2's situation,
that status was not critical to the ultimate holding in the case, which, instead, was tied to
the question of whether the debtor's assets were depleted as a result of the transfer. See infra
note 152. The point was important in the case because the payment from company #2 went

directly to the bank, so its liability thereon was unquestioned. In the typical earmarking
situation, the funds pass through the debtor as a conduit of sort. See, e.g., Buckley v. JeldWen, Inc. (In re Interior Wood Prods. Co.), 986 F.2d 228, 231 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that
"[t]he earmarking doctrine is typically applicable when a third party makes a loan to a debtor
specifically to enable the debtor to satisfy the debt of a designated creditor. In other words,
a new creditor is substituted for an old creditor.").

76. Bank of Newport, 225 U.S. at 185. An additional, but flawed, rationale later courts
offered in justifying application of the earmarking doctrine in the case of guarantors or other
codebtors has been the view that such a result was needed to avoid unfairness and inequity

to the new creditor, in that if the transfer to the old creditor is voided, and the money was
placed in the bankruptcy estate, the new creditor, as guarantor, might end up having to pay
a second time. See supranote 36 & infra text accompanying notes 217-219.
77. Id. at 186 (this meant that the amount of the indebtedness of company #2 could still
be collected by the trustee for the estate).
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surety holds a contingent reimbursement claim against the debtor.78
Upon actual payment to the common creditor, the contingency is
removed and the claim is allowed. 7' This is why a direct payment
to the creditor is not preferential and why all earmarked payments
from the surety to the common creditor should likewise not be
regarded as preferential if made solely to discharge the common debt. 80
However, it needs to be stressed that it does not inevitably follow
from this fact that this is the only circumstance where payments
might properly escape characterization as a preference under the
earmarking doctrine. 81 Stated another way, a difference in degree does
not always translate into difference in kind.82
The Court in National Bank of Newport never used the term
"earmarking," and, technically, it was not what we have now come to
call an "earmarking" case because the funds never passed through
the debtor's hands or came into its possession. However, the principle
that a transfer could not be recovered from a transferee, regardless of
form, if it did not interfere with the value of the pro rata dividend
to unsecured creditors was established and began to be applied by
the courts.83 According to subsequent case authority, 84 invention of
the term in this context is attributed to Judge Augustus Hand in a
1938 decision from the Second Circuit.85 In that case, the court
distinguished the facts from those of NationalBank of Newport based
on the absence of any evidence that the new creditor, with respect to
the two alleged preferential transfers at issue, made its loans on the
condition that the proceeds be applied to a particular existing debt. 88
The court continued, "[t]he existence of . .. control determines whether
the payments were preferential transfers by the bankrupt [now

78. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(2) (2012).
80. This is essentially what transpired in Nat' Bank of Newport, 225 U.S. at 185. See
supra note 75.
81. See infra Section III.A.2.
82. See Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100
B.R. 127, 133 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (making the point that the holding in Nat'l Bank of
Newport did not hinge on the fact that the party making the payment was a surety).
83. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Small (In re Zaferis Bros.), 67 F.2d
140 (9th Cir. 1933); First Nat'l Bank v. Phalen, 62 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1932).
84. See McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561,
565 n.8 (8th Cir. 1988).
85. Smyth v. Kaufman (In re J.B. Koplik & Co.), 114 F.2d 40, 43 (2d. Cir. 1940).
86. Id. at 42.
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debtor] or were payments by a third party who did not make the loans
generally but made them only on condition that a particular creditor
receive the proceeds."

7

That the earmarking doctrine survived enactment of the Code, even
though the plain language of § 547 does not include "earmarking"
88
among the statutory defenses set forth in § 547(c), seems beyond
89
serious quibble. In response to an argument that the doctrine did
not weather adoption of the Code as an integral facet of the current
90
preference regime, the bankruptcy court in In re EUA Power Corp.
pointed out that the judicial development of the earmarking doctrine
under the Bankruptcy Act was deeply entrenched in case law by
9
the time when the Code was being drafted during the 1970s. 1 The
court continued that the legislative history pertinent to the preference
statute of the Bankruptcy Code contains no indication that Congress
sought to eliminate recognition of, what the court described as, "this
92
well-established judicial interpretation of the statute." The EUA
Power court also pointed out that the statutory language regarding
preferences under the Bankruptcy Act was essentially identical to the

87.

Id. In support of their argument that the transfer was not preferential, the defend-

ants relied on a decision from the court made two years earlier in which such an earmarking

defense had been permitted. Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.
1938), discussed infra text accompanying notes 119-36.
88. The earmarking doctrine is not properly a judicially-created addition to Code §
547(c), though it operates in much the same fashion, but rather a heuristic for construing
the language "an interest of the debtor in property" in Code § 547(b). Although not the focus
in this Article, this is why the earmarking doctrine has also been invoked and recognized in
fraudulent transfer cases. See supranote 13. Code § 548 uses essentially the same language
concerning "an interest of the debtor in property." But see David G. Carlson & William H.
Widen, The EarmarkingDefense to Voidable Preference Liability: A Reconceptualization, 73
AM BANKR. L.J. 591, 592 (1999) (claiming that the exception in § 547(c)(1) represents a codification of the earmarking doctrine, and, thus, displaced the common law doctrine recognized under the 1898 Act).
89. Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 153 B.R. 417, 425 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1993) (pointing out that the earmarking doctrine has received widespread acceptance in a
variety of jurisdictions since adoption of the Code); see also authorities cited infra note 96.
90 Official Bondholders Comm. v. E. Utils. Assocs. (In re EUA Power Corp.), 147 B.R. 634
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1992).
91. Id. at 640-41.
92. Id. at 641. It is also widely recognized that authority under the 1898 Act continues
to be precedential, except where expressly stated otherwise in the Code or legislative history.
See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) ("[T]his Court has been reluctant to accept
arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular language under con-

sideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of
at least some discussion in the legislative history."); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. N.J. Dept. of
Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) ("The normal rule of statutory construction is
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially-created
concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this rule with particular care
in construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications.") (citation omitted).
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language of the preference section in the Bankruptcy Code.93 In short,
then, the court found that there was no basis for credibly maintaining
that Congress intended to abolish the earmarking doctrine under the
Code's preference regime.9 4
As early as 1986,95 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed:
"The earmarking doctrine is widely accepted in the bankruptcy
courts as a valid defense against a preference claim . ... "96 In that
Chapter 11 case, the preference action was brought by the creditor's
committee, which was granted authority by the bankruptcy court
to bring the case after the debtor-in-possession refused to take
action. 7 The new creditor was a subsidiary of the debtor that had
hypothecated assets to secure the debt, but had not assumed in
personam liability for the obligation. 98 The court concluded that,
although the funds from the subsidiary had been deposited into the
debtor's account, "no semblance of control [by the debtor] went with
them." 99 Thus, the court found the lower court's application of the
earmarking doctrine to be appropriate. 100 In so doing, the court
rejected the committee's additional argument that the doctrine
could not be employed because of the lack of proof that the third

93. EUA Power, 147 B.R. at 642; see also McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re
Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 565 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that equivalent language has
existed in the Bankruptcy Act for many decades). As a general proposition, where there is
not meaningful difference between provisions of the 1898 Act and the Code, judicial precedent developed under the former may be used in interpreting the analogous provisions of the
latter. See e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208 (1983) (interpreting §
542(a) of the Code); Union Leasing Co. v. Peninsula Gunite, Inc. (In re Peninsula Gunite,
Inc.), 24 B.R. 593, 594 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (involving administrative expense claims).
94. EUA Power, 147 B.R. at 641-42. See also Steinberg v. NCNB Nat'l Bank (In re
Grabill Corp.), 135 B.R. 101, 107-10 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (rejecting an attack on the continued viability of the earmarking doctrine under the Code based on "ample support in the
judicial gloss of the . . . Code and former Bankruptcy Act").
95. The first court of appeals decision under the Code to recognize the earmarking doctrine was Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1981).
96. Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir.
1986), reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Kapela, 649 F.2d at 893); Brown v.
First Nat'l Bank of Little Rock, Ark., 748 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1984); Schilling v. Electronic
Realty Assocs., Inc. (In re Hearn), 49 B.R. 143 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); Hargadon v. Cove
State Bank (In re Jaggers), 48 B.R. 33 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985); Genova v. Rivera Funeral
Home (In re Castillo), 39 B.R. 45 (Bankr. D. Col. 1984).
97. Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1354. The Fifth Circuit also upheld a challenge to the
committee's standing. Id. at 1362-64.
98. Id. at 1353.
99. Id. at 1360.
100. See id. at 1362.

2019]

VEILING SUBSTANCE IN SEMANTICS

359

party payor intended to restrict application of the funds, and the
related fact that the actual restrictions came from the defendant or the
debtor.101
IV. SCOPE OF THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE
A.
1.

Two Views: An Overview

The Codebtor Limitation

There has been considerable discord in the case law in relation to
when the earmarking doctrine will apply. As noted above in connection
with the discussion of WB Services, 102 the most restrictive view is the
one that requires that the new creditor be a codebtor on the obligation
103
that is satisfied with the funds provided by the "new lender."
The justification offered for this view is that, in the codebtor situation,
the guarantor or other obligor risks having to pay twice if the payment
to the old creditor is construed to be, and recovered as, a voidable
preference, and this risk does not exist when the new lender is not a
guarantor or other codebtor.1 04 It is not clear, however, that this
5
distinction is entirely valid, as discussed elsewhere in this Article.10
Moreover, it also wrongly assumes that there is no risk of inequitable
101. Id. at 1361 (demonstrating the third-party's intent is one way of showing the
debtor's lack of dispositive control, but it is not the exclusive method, "especially if there is
adequate proof of the lack of control by a debtor.").
102. See supra text accompanying notes 24-35.
103. See, e.g., Manchester v. First Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 645-49
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008) (advancing an argument that explains why the earmarking doctrine
should not be extended beyond codebtor cases); Gray v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Neponset
River Paper Co.), 231 B.R. 829, 835 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999) (affirming the bankruptcy court's
refusal to apply the earmarking doctrine on the ground, inter alia, that the funds at issue
were not supplied by a guarantor; the use of the funds must benefit the party supplying the
funds); Geremia v. Fordson Assocs. (In re Int'l Club Enters., Inc.), 109 B.R. 562, 566-67
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1990) (stating "we agree ... that extension of the earmarking doctrine beyond
the guarantor situation is both unwise and unwarranted, and would inevitably result in an
inequitable treatment of creditors."). Other cases have applied the doctrine in non-codebtor
cases but expressed reluctance over doing so. E.g., Lucker v. Lewis Auto Glass, Inc. (In re
Francis), 252 B.R. 143, 146-47 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000); Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton
Motors, Inc.) 153 B.R. 417, 427 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1993) (noting the criticism of the doctrine
beyond the codebtor case expressed by the Eighth Circuit in McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 1988)); see infra notes 145-57
and accompanying text for further discussion of the holding in Bohlen). Of course, a guarantor or other person liable on the debt is not really a "new creditor" inasmuch as the Code
provides such parties with a contingent claim for reimbursement or contribution. See §§
101(5)(A) and 502(e); infra text accompanying note 216.
104. Moses, 256 B.R. at 646 (observing that earmarking is equitable in codebtor cases
because if the transfer were to be avoided, the codebtor would be subject to double liability);
see also supra note 36.
105. See supra note 37 and infra text accompanying note 226.
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treatment of the new creditor in non-codebtor cases, 106 a detail
illustrated perhaps by the WB Services case itself.10 7 In any event,
even if this distinction were accurate, whether it presents a sufficiently principled rationale for drawing a line marking the outer
boundary of the earmarking doctrine is a different question entirely,
and one that this Article answers in the negative.105
Decisions applying the codebtor limitation suggest that when the
new creditor is not a guarantor, or the like, the earmarking doctrine
benefits no one other than the old creditor who, "in equity, deserves
no such benefit." 109 In addition to being wrong as a matter of fact, it is
strongly urged that focusing on benefit or advantage to the creditor
receiving the challenged transfer is misguided since what makes a
preference actionable is not that what the creditor receives, 110 but
what the debtor's estate has lost.1
In In re Moses,"z the Tenth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel engaged in an exhaustive review of the case law to date, noting
the sharp division of authority over whether the earmarking doctrine
is limited to codebtor cases.1 1 3 Relying on the absence of express
statutory authority for the doctrine, and citing the broad definition
of property of the estate in § 541 of the Code,11 4 the court concluded

106. See Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566 ("The equities in favor of a guarantor or surety, the risk
of his having to pay twice if the first payment is held to be a voidable preference, are not
present where the new lender is not a guarantor himself.").
107. See supra note 37.
108. See infra Section VI.A (suggesting that the scope of the earmarking doctrine should
be driven by the policy objectives that the preference law was intended to serve and not by
weighing the relative equities among creditors).
109. Cases taking this view include e.g., Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566 (noting that "[t]he only
person aided by the doctrine is the old creditor, who had nothing to do with earmarking the
funds, and who, in equity, deserves no such benefit."); Moses, 256 B.R. at 647; Davis v. Kice
Indus., Inc., (In re WB Servs., LLC), 587 B.R. 548, 557 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2018).
110. See infra note 222.
111. See supra note 38 and infra note 222.
112. Manchester v. First Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2000).
113. Id. at 645-49.
114. By and large, cases cite the Supreme Court's decision in Beiger v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990) for the proposition that the property of the debtor for preference
purposes is best understood as constituting the property that would have been treated as
property of the estate if it had not been transferred prior to the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 58-59; see, e.g., Stingley v. AlliedSignal, Inc. (Inre Libby Int'l, Inc.),
247 B.R. 463, 466 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000); Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R.
682, 696-97 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Libby Int'l); Sherman v. TBK Bank (In re Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.), No. 17-3086, 2018 WL 4348049, at *13 n.36 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2018). But see infra text accompanying notes 266-73 and 288-92, postulating that the definition of property of the estate in § 541(a) should not necessarily control what is understood
to be an interest of the debtor in property for purposes of § 547(b).
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that earmarking should not be extended beyond the codebtor
situation." 5 In what highlights the crux of the conceptual dissonance
that has plagued this subject to date, the court buttressed its holding
by pointing out that the new creditor's funds at issue would have
been available for general creditors if they had not been paid to the old
creditor. 116

The problem with Moses, and decisions like it, is that they start
from the proposition that the earmarking doctrine should not be a
basis to ignore or replace the "transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property" language in 547(b), which might in fact be a defensible line.
However, they then proceed to do just that by making an exception in
the codebtor setting as necessary to avoid "inequity."11 7 The inherent
contradiction between the basis for the limitation-the dictates of the
language of the statute itself-and the justification for the exception
to the rule equity-could hardly be more profound." 8
2.

The Grubb Approach

The codebtor requirement approach is in sharp contrast with
the more traditional attitude toward the scope of the earmarking
doctrine first expressed by Judge Learned Hand in the Second
Circuit's decision in Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp.,
allegedly made by the debtor using funds provided by three different
lenders." 9 The first transfer involved a $25,000 note to which the
defendant was pressing the debtor for payment. In response, the
115. Moses, 256 B.R. at 647.
116. Id. at 651. This somewhat metaphysical argument lacks reality. It is true in the
non-codebtor case that new lender's advance to the debtor creates an indebtedness owed it
by the debtor in return for the loan proceeds, just as a direct purchase of the old creditor's
claim would have done. In an earmarking situation, however, the point is the two transactions are functionally indistinguishable. In substance, all that has occurred is that there has
been a mere substitution of creditors here without any property transfer. In a recent opinion,
it should be noted that the Tenth Circuit BAP, taking a very restricted view of the earmarking doctrine, rejected this argument in an unpublished opinion. Colbert v. Walters (In re
Wagenknecht), Adv. No 18-01018, 2019 WL 2353534, at *11 n.30 (10th Cir. B.A.P., June 4,
2019). In that case the debtor's mother advanced him exactly the sum needed for the purpose

of paying off a law firm creditor. Id. at *10-11. Nonetheless, the court concluded the payment
diminished the estate within the meaning of Parks v. FIA Card Serus. (In re Marshall), 550
F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2008), even if it was uncontroverted that the mother would not have
made the loan to the debtor for any purpose other than to pay the law firm. Wagenknecht,
2019 WL at *12 (finding that the use of the phrase "discretionary use" in Marshall was not
central to the holding in the case).
117. In fact, because a guarantor already has secondary liability on the old debt, it is not
even accurate to refer to it as a "new creditor," though it is routinely done, including in this
Article from time-to-time. Supra note 103.
118. If the language of the statute does not allow exception, it would seem that it does
not allow exception. See infra text accompanying notes 213-14.

119. Id. at 71.
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debtor's principal, one Smith, arranged for Manufacturers Trust Co. to
"take over" the loan with the intention that the debtor would pay it off
within a few days.12 0 On May 14, 1935, Smith signed a note for $25,000
on behalf of the debtor, the proceeds of which were placed in the
debtor's account by Manufacturers Trust.12 ' The plan was for the
debtor to promptly arrange payment to the defendant, but actual
payment, via a cashier's check, did not occur until the following
morning."'
The second and third challenged payments, totaling $12,500, were
related. Following issuance by the debtor to the defendant of $14,000
in checks that were returned for insufficient funds, Smith assured the
principals of the defendant that he would see to it that $12,500 was
secured for the defendant."' To that end, on May 18, the debtor, again
through Smith, arranged to borrow $6,000 from the Dover Plains
National Bank, after assuring the bank that the debtor was "in a jam"
and that the additional $6,500 was to be lent by one Cline of Wassaic,
New York through an Amenia, New York bank." 4 After confirming the
loan from Cline, Dover Plains agreed to lend the funds "to tide [the
debtor] over in an emergency.""' The debtor had a certified check in
favor of defendant drawn against the account in which the Dover
Plains funds had been deposited.12 6 Although Cline appeared not to
care how the $6,500 loan from him was used, at the request of the
debtor, Cline had his bank draw a check made payable directly to the
defendant.
Because the debtor was insolvent on May 15 and May 18, and filed
bankruptcy in June, the trustee brought a preference action under
§ 60b of the 1898 Act to recover all three payments. In its answer, the
defendant asserted that none of the three payments was made with
funds in the debtor's control or from the debtor's assets and, therefore,

120. The opinion indicates Smith was in "absolute control of the" debtor. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 71-72. According to the opinion, the defendant was to surrender its own note
for cancellation upon such payment and deliver to the Manufacturers Trust Co. the collateral
securing the note. Unbeknownst to everyone but Smith, the instrument under which the
defendant's interest in the collateral was created had been forged by Smith. Id. at 72.
123. Id. at 72.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Apparently, Smith originally misrepresented how the loan proceeds would be
used, but a representative of the Amenia bank, knowing the funds were going to the defendant, induced Smith to be honest with Cline.
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recovery should be denied.12" The trial court agreed and dismissed the
trustee's complaint. 1 2 9 As to the first payment, from Manufacturers
Trust, the court of appeals sustained the lower court's dismissal of the
trustee's claim, reasoning that, although the funds had been deposited
in the debtor's account, the defendant was paid by a cashier's check
the next morning, and that "[i]t is entirely plain that the trust
company did not intend to let [the debtor] have any control over
the credit before it got the collateral" 3 0 from defendant along with
assignment of the debtor's note."'
As to the payment through Cline, the court reached the same
conclusion despite the fact that, in this instance, "Cline had no interest
in what disposition Smith would make of the money which he lent him;
and imposed no condition on it."12 However, Cline's loan was credited
by the Amenia bank to Smith, and not the debtor, and then delivered
to the defendant by check made payable to the defendant. Thus, the
court agreed that the debtor had no control over the funds and that
Cline's promise to loan was also not an asset of the estate because
"... . the loan was to be for only a few days and the damages recoverable
upon the breach of such a promise would have been scarcely more than
nominal."1 3 The court found the transfer of funds from the Dover
Plains bank to be a closer call due to the fact that, even though the
bank certified the check made directly payable to the defendant, the
funds remained in the debtor's possession until the check was actually
delivered and negotiated.1 4 Nevertheless, based on evidence that
the purpose of the loan was made clear and it was intended as a very
short-term accommodation for this purpose, the court ruled that there
was a sufficient showing to support the finding below."'

128. In support of its position, the debtor cited the Supreme Court's holding in Nat? Bank
of Newport, N.Y. v. Nat? Herkimer Co. Bank, 225 U.S. 178 (1912), arguing that the transactions at issue entailed no more than "[a] substitution of one creditor for the another without
loss to the estate, as when a surety gives money to [its] principal to discharge the debt." Id.
at 72.
129. Grubb, 94 F.2d at 72.
130. Id. As noted supra note 123, both Manufacturers Trust Co. and the defendant
assumed the collateral to be good.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 71-72.
133. Id. at 72-73 (citations omitted).
134. See id. When a drawee-bank "accepts" a check, it is assuming primary liability to
pay. However, the court noted that under the then-governing Negotiable Instruments Law
a drawer may return a certified check to the drawee (as opposed to deliver it to the named
payee) and obtain reimbursement of the amount charged to the drawer's account on ac-

ceptance. Today acceptance of a check is defined in § 3-409 of Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the effect of acceptance governed by § 3-413.
135. Grubb, 90.F.2d at 73.
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Because Grubb reflected the prevailing attitude toward the
earmarking doctrine at the time of the adoption of the Code, it is
worth noting a few highlights from the description above. As to the
Manufacturers Trust and Dover Plains' transactions, what seemed to
matter most to the court was the intention of the new creditor, and
much less so possession or even control by the debtor. As to the Cline
transfer, where the new creditor was apparently indifferent with
over what Smith and/or the debtor did with the proceeds, what loomed
largest was the debtor's apparent absence of any meaningful control.
This suggests that, in fact, the court was employing an overall
approach where no one factor is dispositive or even essential. Rather,
what appears ultimately to have been most salient for the court was
to discern from the totality of the circumstances the true substance
and net effect of each transfer; i.e., was it more like a direct transfer
from the new creditor to the old creditor or was it more like an
undesignated loan to the debtor and then an unrelated payment to
the old creditor. Put in alternative words, did it diminish the value of
the debtor's assets (and the later-to-be-formed) estate in a manner that
compromised the core policy of ratable distribution.13 6 That approach
has much to commend itself, as addressed more fully below.131
B.

Code Authority

As explained earlier, there is no quarrel that the earmarking
doctrine was carried forward under the Bankruptcy Code.138 As to
the scope of the doctrine, the aforementioned decision of the Fifth
Circuit in Coral Petroleum,'139 one of the early circuit court of appeals
decisions to address the issue post-Code, appeared to carry-forward
much (although not all) of the logical reasoning of the Second Circuit
in Grubb.4 0 Specifically, the new creditor, although an indirect

136. See Warsco v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 258 F.3d 557, 564 n.11 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Courts
considering this element [interest of the debtor in property] of the preference provision have
focused on whether the transfer diminished the debtor's estate."). That rationale was also
used by the Court in Nat'l Bank of Newport, 225 U.S. 178 (1912), to buttress principal holding. Id. at 184.
137. See infra Section D.1.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
139. Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986),
reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 398 (1986); see supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
140. Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1938). This is not to
say that the holding in Coral Petroleum squarely corresponds with Grubb inasmuch as the
Second Circuit's decision took account of a wide range of considerations (see supra text accompanying note 137) whereas Coral Petroleum placed much greater emphasis on dominion
or control over the funds by the debtor.
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subsidiary of the debtor, was not jointly liable on the obligation."'
Moreover, the court held that neither the deposit of funds in the
debtor's account prior to payment nor lack of proof that the new
creditor intended to restrict use of funds to payment of the defendant
alone (or in combination) negated application of the earmarking
doctrine.1 2 Rather, for the Coral Petroleum court, the "key" to resolution of the issue depended on whether, as a practical matter, the
debtor had any meaningful control over the funds when the allegedly
preferential transfer occurred.' 4 3
By contrast with Coral Petroleum the Eighth Circuit, in In re
Bohlen,144 approached the earmarking doctrine with much greater
restraint and also took a very different approach than the methodology
employed by Judge Hand in Grubb."6 A factually convoluted case
essentially involving a check-kiting scheme conducted by the debtor's
president,1 46 the trustee challenged three payments, totaling over
4 7
$191,000, made to the defendant-bank during the preference period.
The bank defended alternatively under the earmarking doctrine and
failure of the facts to demonstrate satisfaction of the greater amount
test in § 547(b)(5).148 The bankruptcy court held that a portion of the
transferred funds was shielded from avoidance under the earmarking
doctrine and the district court affirmed. 149
141. The subsidiary did, however, place a deposit in the amount of the loan with the
defendant to serve as pledged collateral. Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1353.
142. Id. at 1361-63. The district court had ruled that, while the form of the transfer
might have indicated a payment from the subsidiary to the debtor, there was no issue of
material fact that the substance of this transfer was anything other than a payment by the
subsidiary to the defendant and that "'[w]hat essentially occurred was a substitution of Leeward as a creditor for the creditor status of Paribas-Suisse.' " Id. at 1356.
143. Id. at 1358. The court's emphasis on "control" over the funds or their deployment
makes the holding narrower than the holding in Grubb. It is also, ultimately, not helpful.
See Carlson & Widen, supranote 88, at 596-97 (pointing out that control is too manipulable
to serve as a reliable criterion and "providel no guidance to courts whatever."); see also infra
note 203 (collecting case authority that take a variety different approaches to the concept of
control).

144. McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo, 859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988).
145. Id. at 566 (citing Grubb as among the cases that adopted what the court described
as an extension of the earmarking doctrine that lacked any basis).
146. Id. at 562-64.
147. "Allthree checks were payable to the [defendant-bank]." Id. at 562.
148. Id. at 564. The opinion did not address the defendant's argument under § 547(b)(5),
but, once it was determined that the proceeds from the new loan became property of the
estate, it is unlikely that the trustee would have much difficulty in establishing satisfaction
of the greater amount test.

149. Id. The bankruptcy judge concluded that approximately $125,000 was shielded under the earmarking doctrine since that was the amount that the debtor had indicated to the
new lender would be paid to the defendant to retire an existing debt. Instead, what the debtor
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On further appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that the earmarking
doctrine had been routinely extended beyond the codebtor situation
that obtained in the Supreme Court's decision National Bank of
Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank, 150 and that many
courts have applied it where the new creditor simply lends funds
to the debtor or pays the old creditor directly.15 1 Even though the
holding in National Bank did not necessarily depend on the fact that
the new creditor was a guarantor, 5 2 the Bohlen court expressed
serious misgivings over the wisdom of this expansion of the earmarking doctrine in circumstances where there is no guarantor."
Nevertheless, the court refrained from ruling as to whether the
earmarking doctrine "should be preserved, limited, or even rejected"
in the non-guarantor scenario,154 and instead adopted a three-part
test for determining whether the earmarking doctrine applies.15 5
Because the second element-performance of the agreement

did is paid off a larger obligation to the defendant/bank that had not been disclosed to the
new lender.

150. 225 U.S. 178 (1912).
151. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 564-65.
152. In Nat'l Bank of Newport, the Court did state that, as an endorser on the note from
the debtor, the debtor's subsidiary had standing to pay the obligation, which is true. See
supratext accompanying notes 75-76. However, there is nothing intrinsic to the holding in
the decision that suggests that the source funds involved in payment of the old creditor must
come from a surety of one kind or another. See Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re
Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100 B.R. 127, 139 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (observing, in rejecting the argument that the holding in Nat'l Bank of Newport was confined to sureties,
that the Court's emphasis was upon the fact that the funds never become part of the debtor's
property rather than upon the motive for payment).
153. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566; see also Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In re Heitkamp),
137 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Bohlen in the context of the refinance of a
secured debt). The holding in Heitkamp is discussed critically infra Section VI.D., although
not with respect to its conclusion that application of the earmarking doctrine is not limited
to situations in which the new creditor is secondarily liable for the earlier debt.

154. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566.
155. Id. The three components of the test are:
(1)

the existence of an agreement between the new lender and the

debtor that the new funds will be used to pay a specified antecedent
debt
(2)

performance of that agreement according to its terms ...

the transaction viewed as a whole (including the transfer in of the
new funds and the transfer out to the old creditor) does not result
in any diminution of the estate.
Accord Shubert v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (In re Winstar Commc'ns., Inc.), 554 F.3d 382, 400 (3d
Cir. 2009).
(3)
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between the new lender and the debtor in accordance with its
terms-was not met on the facts of the case, the court concluded that
the judgment below should be reversed.1 6
In a dissenting opinion that tracks much more closely than the
majority opinion to the argument advanced in this Article,' Judge
McMillian noted that "[i]f a transfer has no effect on the assets of the
debtor available for distribution to creditors, it is not a preferential
transfer." 158 On the facts of the case, the dissent observed that the
transfer to the old creditor was traceable to funds that the new creditor
advanced to the debtor specifically for that purpose and without
intent that they would become unrestricted property of the debtor.159
Thus, citing the lower court opinion in Grubb,160 the Bohlen dissent
concluded that "the debtor's momentary physical control over the
6
funds" was not alone sufficient to defeat the earmarking doctrine,'
and the payment of such funds to the old creditor in no way diminished
the estate.1 62 For these reasons, Judge McMillan argued that the lower
6
courts' denial of the preference challenge should have been affirmed.'
The majority opinion in Bohlen is puzzling. While sharply critical
of cases that expand the scope of the earmarking doctrine beyond the
codebtor situation, its' holding did not limit application of the doctrine
to that scenario; its three-prong test wholly ignores the status of the
new creditor.1 64 Moreover, nowhere in the standard applied by the
court is the requirement, so central in Coral Petroleum, that the debtor

156. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 567. The debtor had applied the funds to a loan other than the
one that the new creditor stipulated should be paid off with the new loan proceeds. Id. at
563.
157. See infra Section VI.D.
158. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 568 (McMillian, Circuit J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Grubb v. Gen. Contract Purchase Corp., 18 F. Supp. 680, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd,
94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938).
161. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 568-69 ("[T]he debtor's momentary physical control over the
funds does not preclude application of the 'earmarked funds' doctrine"). But see Buchwald
Capital Advisors LLC v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that "earmarking does not apply where a debtor exercises control
over the funds, even for a brief period"); U. S. Lines (S.A.) v. United States (In re McLean
Indus.), 162 B.R. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that earmarking does not apply where a
debtor exercises control over the funds, even for a brief period), reo'd on other grounds, 30
F.3d 385 (2d Cir. 1994).
162. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 568 (McMillian, Circuit J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 569 ("To disregard the clear intention of the new creditor is to unjustly enrich
the debtor's estate as a result of the debtor's own breach of its obligation. This is the kind of
injustice that the 'earmarked funds' doctrine was created to avoid.").
164. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566. The three-part test articulated by the court does not hinge
in any way on the fact that the "new lender" was already liable on the obligation. It would
apply equally to both codebtor and non-codebtor cases.
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not exercise inappropriate control over the funds passing from the new
to the old creditor. Rather, its' three-part standard focused on
intent, execution, and net effect. 161 While this Article also advances the
position that the absence of "control" should not be either a necessary
predicate or the exclusive ground for application of the earmarking
defense, the Bohlen test, or at least its first two elements, seem overly
ritualized in requiring an actual agreement between the debtor and
the new lender, and the faithful execution thereof. These requirements
rather severely and unnecessarily crimp the field of operation for the
third prong of the Bohlen test, which, ironically, is the requirement
that is the one most sensitive to the relevant policy considerations;
namely, diminution of the estate. 166
Before delving further into the issue of the proper range of the
earmarking doctrine, there is good reason to parse the source of
the authority that accounts for the doctrine in the first place, as it
should inform that discussion at least to the extent of assuring
that any proposed formulation for the earmarking concept rests
on a sound legal foundation. As has been seen, there is ample
evidence that the bankruptcy courts' prerogative to invoke the
doctrine continued under the Code. 167 But since the license to do so
does not stem from the language of the Code itself, as it also did

165. Id. at 568-69. "Control" really only becomes an issue in the dissent, which seems to
assume that the fact the funds passed through the debtor's hands was an important factor
to the majority. See supratext accompanying note 162. However, while not part of its threepronged test for establishing an earmarking defense, the majority opinion concluded that,
even if relevant, the debtor exercised impermissible control. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 567 ("One
cannot conceive of greater or more telling 'control' of the new funds by the debtor than to
have the debtor use them for its own purposes and in violation of its agreement with the new
lender."). The court also disagreed with the statement of the bankruptcy judge below that "a
court of equity should 'look through form to substance' and should 'act to achieve the intended result [of the parties]'. Failure to do so, [the bankruptcy court urged,] would result in
unjust enrichment to the estate and the general creditors." Id. Contrary to the majority opinion of the Eighth Circuit, it is a central tenet of this treatment that it is precisely such an
approach (as recognized by the bankruptcy court in Bohlen) that should guide application of
the earmarking doctrine in the future. See infra Section VI.A.
166. The Bohlen standard devalues the diminution concept since, if either step 1 or step
2 are not satisfied, the analysis never reaches the diminution question. Contrarily, this Article urges that if there is no diminution of the estate, step 2 is dispensable and step 1-the
intent requirement-should be satisfied with something less than an agreement between the
debtor and the new lender. See infra Section VI.D; see also Manty v. Miller Homes, Inc. (In
re Nation-Wide Exch. Serv., Inc.) 291 B.R. 131, 146-47 n.18 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003) (noting
that, as a technical matter, the third factor in Bohlen is a little confusing since there is no
estate in existence at the time of the transfer. "It might be better understood as a requirement that the transfer leave the debtor's asset structure in parity with the state it was in
before the transaction.").
167. See supratext accompanying notes 89-94.
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not under the 1898 Act, 168 it is fair to question from whence does
the ability to graft this exception on to the preference law derive,
and just how broadly might the authority extend?
V.

EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE

BANKRUPTCY COURTS

Although the academic commentary contains a creative argument
to the contrary based on an interpretation of the contemporaneous
new value exception of § 547(c)(1) that obviates the need entirely for
the earmarking doctrine, 169 it is universally accepted in the decisional
law that the earmarking doctrine, which originated as a judicially170
conceived invention that was essentially equitable in nature,
continued as such under the Code.'7 For instance, the majority opinion
in Bohlen, observed that the cases that have involved the earmarking
doctrine either in codebtor cases or otherwise have done so by invoking
general equitable principles. 17 2 While expressing misgivings over
the wisdom of extending the doctrine to the non-codebtor situation on
a similar basis, the court in Bohlen did not reject the authority of
the bankruptcy courts to employ equitable principles in proper
circumstances. Rather, the court merely surmised that such principles
might not demand the kind of broad interpretation that many courts
had accorded to the earmarking doctrine. 173
168. See 1898 Act § 60b.
169. See Carlson & Widen supra note 88, at 591-92 (asserting that the "contemporaneous
exchange for new value" exception § 547(c)(1) codified, and thus abolished the earmarking
doctrine as an "extra-statutory, judge-created exception to § 547(b) liability."). While this
view has not received any traction, it is certainly true that part of the rationale for codification of § 547(c)(1) is that other creditors are not adversely affected by the transfer if, as a
practical matter, the debtor has received new value. Dietz v. Calandrillo (In re Genmar Holdings, Inc.), 776 F.3d 961, 963 (8th Cir. 2015). This is why this statutory defense is often raised
in addition to the earmarking defense. E.g., Golfview Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. All-Tech Decorating
Co., (In re Golfview Dev. Ctr., Inc.), 309 B.R. 758 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).
170. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
171. E.g., Caillouet v. First Bank and Tr. (In re Entringer Bakeries, Inc.), 548 F.3d 344,
347 n.3 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing the earmarking doctrine as a judicially-created, equitable
exception to § 547(b) "that holds that money loaned to a debtor by a new creditor to pay an
existing debt to an old creditor is not a 'transfer of an interest of the debtor in property.' ");
Hansen v. McDonald Meat Co. (In re Kemp Pac. Fisheries), 16 F.3d 313, 316 n.2 (9th Cir.
1994) ("earmarking doctrine is a creature of equity"); Barreto v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y
Credito de Aguiadilla) (In re Barreto), 2018 WL 5883911, * 5, ADv. PRoc. 16-0172 (D. P.R.,
Nov. 7, 2018) (same); see also supra authorities cited in note 96.
172. Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 565-66 (observing that "the language used has been that the
debtor was holding the new funds 'in trust' or in a 'fiduciary capacity.' ").
173. Id. at 567. The court stated that "[e]quity does not require a court to construct a
hypothetical transaction which did not occur in order to allow what is really a preference to
remain in the old creditor's hands." Of course, by recognizing applicability of the earmarking
doctrine in the codebtor situation, that's exactly what the court did.
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The adage that bankruptcy courts are "courts of equity" is routinely
bandied about and has been for a long time.1 7 4 Whether that
apothem is in fact true, and to what extent, has been the subject of
considerable dialogue in the literature.' 7 6 The bankruptcy courts'
equitable authority is generally understood to derive from § 105(a)
of the Code.1 76 Whatever the scope of that authority may once have
been, 7 7 there is little room for doubt that it has been circumscribed

174. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) ("[F]or many purposes 'courts of
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in
equity.'" (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934)); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine
Fund II (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that bankruptcy courts have the "equitable authority to ensure 'that substance will not give way to
form, that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done' ")
(quoting Pepper, 308 U.S. at 305)); see also Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966)
(observing "that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction") (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Pepper, 308 U.S. at 304-05)); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n. v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940). Judge Ahart has traced the origins of the
maxim that the "bankruptcy court is a court of equity" to the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. See
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 8, 5 Stat. 440 (An Act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy
throughout the United States) (repealed 1843); Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied
Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79

AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 13-16 (2005).
175.

Alan M. Ahart, A Stern Reminder that the Bankruptcy Court Is Not a Court of Eq-

uity, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2012) (asserting that the Supreme Court's decision in
Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) corroborated his 2005 conclusion that the bankruptcy
courts are not courts of equity); Edith H. Jones, The Bankruptcy Galaxy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 269,
270-71 (1999) ("Approaching bankruptcy from the standpoint of a law court instead of an
equity court may, in my view, lead to a more even balance between debtors' and creditors'
rights."); Marcia S. Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity": What Does That
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 310 (1999) (arguing that while the shibboleth that bankruptcy
courts are courts of equity is among the most frequently uttered in the court room, "[flrom
historical, procedural, jurisprudential, and practical perspectives the bankruptcy court is not
a court of equity. It is, instead, a specialized court of limited jurisdiction applying statutory
law .... "). But see Randolph J. Haines, The Conservative Assault on FederalEquity, 88 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 451, 455 n.23 (2014) (referring to the arguments the bankruptcy courts are not
courts of equity as "formulistic" and observing that the jurisdictional amendments in 1978
and 1984 were intended to broaden, not narrow, bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction from what
it had been under the 1898 Act).
176. Section 105(a) of the Code states, in pertinent part: "The court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the
Code]." 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). It derives from § 2(a)(15) of the of 1898 Act, and, according to
the legislative history, is intended to operate similarly to the Federal All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (2012). H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 316-317 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 5973; see also Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 27 (2006) (suggesting that the
equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts may also stem from 28 U.S.C. § 1481, providing
that "[a] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and
admiralty ... ", even though that provision no longer appears in the current compilation (or
the previous three) of the United States Code).
177. See supra note 175; see also Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507
U.S. 380, 389 (1993) (noting that bankruptcy courts are "necessarily entrusted with broad
equitable powers").
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to some considerable degree in recent years. 178 Most notably, in
Law v. Siegel,179 the Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy
courts' statutory authority under § 105(a) to issue any order that is
"necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code" does not allow a bankruptcy court to ignore or override the
180
explicit mandates of specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Further, the Court ruled that any inherent authority of the courts
was similarly not license to contravene the express terms of a specific
Code provision.1 81
A question, thus, arises over whether a broad application of the
earmarking doctrine-or for that matter any application-exceeds
the acknowledged scope of the bankruptcy courts' equitable

178. As early as 1988, the Supreme Court held that "whatever equitable powers remain
in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code." Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). See generally Nicholas B. Malito, Recent Developments: Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 2014 NORTON
ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTcY LAw 13 (2014) (noting that each year the appellate courts

decide at least one case aimed at reinforcing the limitations of the equitable authority of the
bankruptcy courts under § 105(a)). While the appellate courts have been more attentive in
recent years to limiting the scope of the bankruptcy courts' authority under § 105(a), the
intellectual justification for the effort undoubtedly finds its moorings in Judge Posner's opinion in In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad Corp., Co., decided under the
1898 Act, in which Judge Posner wrote: "The fact that a proceeding is equitable does not give
the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal
views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be." 791 F.2d 524, 528
(7th Cir. 1986) (citing Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 867-68 (7th Cir. 1985).
179. 571 U.S. 415, 420-21 (2014); see also United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308
(5th Cir. 1986); accord Smart World Techs., LLC v. Juno Online Servs., Inc. (In re Smart
World Techs., LLC), 423 F.3d 166, 184 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing New Eng. Diaries, Inc. v. Dairy
Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003)) (describing bankruptcy
courts' § 105(a) powers as generally limited to filling gaps in the statutory language)).
180. Law, 571 U.S. at 421 (internal citations omitted). The decision in Law represented
a sharp pull-back from the view expressed by the Court just seven years earlier in Marrama
v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365 (2007), where the Court referred to "the broad authority of bankruptcy judges to take any action that is necessary or appropriate 'to prevent
an abuse of process,' " and the "inherent power of every federal court to sanction 'abusive

litigation practices.' " Id. at 375-76. For a more cynical, but perhaps realistic, explanation for
the Supreme Court's recent reduction in the scope of bankruptcy judges' inherent power, see
John A.E. Pottow & Jason S. Levin, Rethinking Criminal Contempt in the Bankruptcy
Courts, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 312 (2007) (questioning whether we are in a new era of
"bankruptcy judge (dis)respectability.") At a minimum, there is no doubt that the high Court
has used the bankruptcy cases that have come before it to advance a "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction. See Chase Manhattan Mort. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee),
530 F.3d 458, 470 n.10 (6th Cir. 2008) (commenting on the "common theme" in the Court's
bankruptcy jurisprudence that courts should apply a plain meaning approach in construing
Code provision, except when doing so would produce a result patently at odds with the intent
of Congress).
181. Law, U.S. 571 at 421 (referencing the power to sanction abusive litigation practices,
the Court stated that "[c]ourts' inherent sanctioning powers are likewise subordinate to valid
statutory directives and prohibitions.").
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powers.i12 At least one contemporary decision, after considering
the more recently-imposed limitations on applying equity in bankruptcy, held nonetheless "that the earmarking doctrine is valid and
does not contravene any express provision of the Bankruptcy
Code. The judicially-created earmarking doctrine balances the
express provisions in section 541, property of the estate, and section
547, preferences."183 This analysis seems correct. There is a consequential difference between defying a specific provision of the Code, as
occurred in Law v. Siegel, or creating a substantive right that does
not otherwise exist,1 84 and providing judicial gloss beyond the
express language of a statute in order to effectuate its intended
purpose. In fact, the latter is the hallmark of a common law system,
even when dealing with statutory text.181

Therefore, Law v. Siegel and other cases that deny application of

§ 105(a) in situations where its use is contrary to or wholly outside
of the bounds of actual provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not
bar inclusion of the earmarking exception under the orthodoxy of
contemporary preference theory. The teaching of those authorities
simply does not extend so far as to foreclose the ability of or the

182. Barreto v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Aguiadilla (In re Barreto), No. 1408712, 2018 WL 5883911, at * 6, Adv. Proc. 16-0172 (D. P.R., Nov. 7, 2018) (acknowledging
that, after Law, the equitable powers of the bankruptcy courts have been "significantly diminished.").
183. Id. at * 6 (citing Official Bondholders Comm. v. E. Utils. Assocs. (In re EUA Power
Corp.), 147 B.R. 634 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1992)). Of note, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp.,
173 S. Ct. 973, 984 (2017), the Supreme Court had another opportunity to evaluate the reach
of equity powers under the Bankruptcy Code. The Jevic analysis took into account to considerations that were not emphasized in Law v. Siegel, including the relevance of fundamental
bankruptcy policies to the analysis and the nature of the proposed action as interim or final
relief.
184. Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308 ("That statute [§ 105] does not authorize the bankruptcy
courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or

constitute a roving commission to do equity.") (citing S. Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758
F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985)).
185. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 805, 834 (1989) (observing that we cannot know what a statute means until a court says what it means on specific
facts, and concluding from this that:
The common law is all the law we have . . . . [W]e understand that statutory interpretation
happens in courts. We are all realists now; we know that a statute gives us only something
to go on until we have some pronouncements from the judiciary [which] . . . in turn, give[s]

us only something to go on until we have some pronouncements from the judiciary.
While statutory interpretation and common law decision making are not, in fact, identical;
the difference is one of degree rather than of kind.
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need for the bankruptcy courts to provide an interpretive gloss to a
statute that is, after all, uniquely federal in purpose and content."
The point to be made is that, when invoked, the earmarking
doctrine, as traditionally conceived,1 87 neither flouts nor clashes
with the express language of § 547(b). To the contrary, it decodes
the language of the statute in a manner that assures that critical
legislative intent is enforced. That is to say, a principled application
of the earmarking doctrine introduces some play into the joints
of the system so as to ameliorate the adventitious results that
excessive deference to formalistic mechanical rules can sometimes
produce. No legislative prescription, no matter how painstakingly
conceived and tightly drawn, can ever be sensitive enough to capture
all of the fluid nuances of commercial behavior and the norms
of the marketplace. In sum, the bankruptcy courts' equitable
authority in § 105(a) to "carry out" provisions of Title 11 would be
impoverished beyond all recognition if it did include the capacity to
ensure that "substance will not give way to form" when applying

186. Under Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56 (1979), the bankruptcy courts are
bound to defer to state law, absent a compelling federal interest, when dealing with state
law property rights, interests, and priorities. However, the preference law has no counter-

part under state law. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47 and accompanying text. The
principles expressed by the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
shunning development of a federal common law in areas traditionally subject to authority of
the state courts, is not a barrier. Thus, the bankruptcy courts possess more discretion in
assuring that, on particular facts, the statute is applied consistent with legislative purpose.
187. That conception being that, in substance, nothing has changed other than one creditor has been substituted for another creditor. See supra note 14-15 and accompanying text.
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the technical elements of a voidable preference. 188 Thus, it seems
clear that there remains a continuing legal foundation for judiciallygrafted limitations on the reach of § 547(b).
VI.

ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE
EARMARKING DOCTRINE

Earlier, it was observed that two views about the scope of the
earmarking doctrine have emerged: limit its application to the
codebtor setting or extend it to funds advanced by a new creditor
with no prior relationship to the transaction or liability on the old
debt. 189 That assertion is true and not true. True in the sense that
those are the two main, antipodal views involving the cardinal
dimensions of the earmarking doctrine, but not true because of
multiple different, overlapping, and inconsistent tests that have
been developed to determine when funds qualify as earmarked so as
to immunize their transfer from preference liability whether in the
codebtor or the true third-party setting.

188. As a general proposition, there is a strong bias in the law that the substance of a
transaction, rather than its form, should determine its consequences. In the preference
realm, see Halbert v. Dimas (In re Halbert) 576 B.R. 586, 592 (Bankr N.D. Ill. 2017) (noting,
in connection of whether a debt was in the nature of a domestic support obligation for purposes of § 547(c)(7), a determination must be made based on the totality of the circumstances,
"looking at the substance of the obligation owed, and not its form."); Stanziale v. Khan (In re
Evergreen Energy, Inc.), 546 B.R. 549, 563-64 n.43 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016) (recognizing that
substance must prevail over form in the determination of whether a party is an "insider" for
purposes of § 547(b)); cf. Corp. Resource Servs., Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re TS
Emp't, Inc. 597 B.R. 494, 531 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019), a case involving, inter alia, an attempt
by the trustee to set aside certain transfers as constructively fraudulent based on the absence
of reasonably equivalent return value. In rejecting the trustee's position, the court noted that
fraudulent transfer law has always "exalted substance over form" and that "the 'real test of
a fraudulent conveyance ... is the unjust diminution of the debtor's estate.' "(citing Orr. v.
Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting 1 GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 195, at 348 (rev. ed. 1940)). A similar argument can be
validly made with respect to the preference statute. See supra note 96. Similarly, although
there is a split in the circuits over whether state or federal law governs the exercise, at least
seven courts of appeal have held that bankruptcy courts possess the authority to recharacterize a transaction branded as a loan to the entity-debtor from a debt to an equity contribution, thereby effectively subordinating that interest to the claims of the debtor's general unsecured creditors. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Whither Recharacterization,68 RUTGERS U. L.
REV. 1217, 1219 (2016). But see Rodriguez v. Cyr (In re Cyr), 602 B.R. 315, 348 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex., Apr. 1, 2019) (declining the trustees request that the court use "its equity powers to
delve behind the form of the transactions and relationships to determine the substance," on
the basis that the court cannot use it equity powers to override the law.) ("While this Court
may be a court of equity, this Court is of the opinion that equity follows the law.") (internal
citations omitted).
189. See discussion supra Section A.
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In In re Moses, 190 discussed earlier,191 the bankruptcy appellate
panel observed that there were three tests that had developed in
the case law for determining application of the earmarking doctrine:
an "intent" test,1 92 a "control" test, 193 and a "diminution of the estate"
test.1 94 In In re Marshall,9 ' the Tenth Circuit managed to classify
the randomized decisional law into just two approaches for ascertaining whether a transfer of property was a transfer of "an interest
of the debtor in property" for purposes of § 547(b): a "dominion/
97
control" test 196 and a "diminution of the estate" test.1 In a thoughtful
student Note analyzing the earmarking doctrine in connection with
credit card transfers,1 98 the author determined that the case law could
99
be grouped into two different tests denominated: the "Bohlen" test1
and the "control" test.200 Finally, in his influential treatise, Professor
Tabb groups the cases into a "diminution of the estate" and a "control
of funds" approach. 201
While not entirely unhelpful, these classifications obviously are
not and cannot be wholly accurate, consistent, or precise. Moreover,
the fact that different efforts to catalogue the case law under a limited
number of standards has produced different results implies rather
strongly that the boundaries of these categories are neither as fixed
nor as mutually exclusive as the expression of them in finite terms
might imply. It also illustrates that these different tests and concepts

190. Manchester v. First Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2000).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
192. In re Moses, 256 B.R. at 649-650 (the court ascribed this approach to the Eighth
and Third Circuits).
193. Id. at 650 (citing decisions from the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
194. Id; see generally In re Safe-T-Brake of S. Fla., Inc., 162 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1993); Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 97 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 1996) (as examples
of this approach, the court cited two bankruptcy court decisions).
195. In re Marshall, 550 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 2008).
196. Id. at 1255. The court indicated that this test (dominion/control) was followed by
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.
197. Id. The court identified this approach (diminution) as representing the view of the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits as well, of course, of the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
198. Michael Benzaki, Accepting the Earmarking Doctrine: Courts Should Accept this
Defense to Preference Actions in Connection with Credit Card Transactions, 24 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 473, 483 (2016). See generally, In re Marshall, 550 F.3d 1251, as an example of
a case rejecting the argument that credit card payments do not represent the transfer "of an

interest of the debtor in property."
199. Benzaki, supra note 199, at 483.
200. Id. at 483-84. See generally, Gray v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Neponset River Paper
Co.), 231 B.R. 829, 835 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999).
201.

2016).

See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY

§

6.11, 501-04 (4th ed. West

376

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:337

are elastic and, in a non-pejorative sense, quite susceptible to
manipulation. For instance, even among courts that regard "control"
as a decisive factor, there is no consensus over what quantum of
control is enough to preclude application of the earmarking doctrine. 2 02
The reality is that the reported earmarking decisions cannot be
neatly classified into any fixed number of categories; they range
across a spectrum because of the inherently idiosyncratic nature of the
underlying factual backstory in each case. Therefore, the attempt to
stuff them all into a limited number of pigeonholes is, if not futile,
certainly artificial. What the "tests" that have been identified for
determining when the doctrine applies really represent is a list of
prudential considerations that should be borne in mind in analyzing
the facts of future cases and in developing perhaps more useful
precedent going forward than has been the case to this point.
As its serpentine history affirms, 20 3 the preference law itself has
been characterized by multiple, oft-conflicting premises and objectives.
202. Compare Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan) 503 F.3d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 2007)
("The proper application of the earmarking doctrine depends not on whether the debtor temporarily obtains possession of new loan funds, but instead on whether the debtor is obligated
to use those funds to pay an antecedent debt."), and Adams v. Anderson (In re Superior
Stamp & Coin Co.), 223 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that just because the funds are
deposited in the debtor's account and the debtor has the power to divert the loan to a different
use does not negate application of the earmarking doctrine), and Sherman v. TBK Bank (In
re Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.), No. 16-034855-BJH, 2018 WL 4348049 at *8 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex., Sept. 7, 2018) (articulating the standard in terms of level of control, but concluding
that ultimately, " 'it is the effect of the transaction, rather than the debtor's or creditor's
intent, that is controlling.' ") (citing T.B. Westex Food, Inc. v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp.(In re T.B.
Westex Foods, Inc., 950 F.2d 1187, 1195 (5th Cir.1992)), and Halter v. Aircomfort (In re
Consolidated FGH Liquidating Tr.), 392 B.R. 648 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008) (observing that
"the determinative factor as to whether the property is part of the debtor's estate is whether
the debtor has dispositive control over the property"), with Campbell v. Hanover Ins. Co. (In
re ESA Envtl. Specialists), 709 F.3d 388, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that the earmarking
defense only applies when the proceeds of the new loan are transferred directly by the lender

to the old creditor, or are paid to the debtor with the understanding that they will be paid
to the creditor in satisfaction of his claim, so long as the proceeds are clearly earmarked),

and Buchwald Cap. Advisors v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 335
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (rejecting earmarking as a defense "where a debtor exercises control
over the funds, even for a brief period"), and U. S. Lines, Inc. v. United States (In re McLean
Indus. Inc.), 162 B.R. 410, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 30 F.3d 385 (2d
Cir. 1994), and Davis v. Kice Indus., Inc. (In re WB Servs., LLC), 587 B.R. 548, 561-62
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2018) (reasoning that the debtor's lack of possession of the funds does not
automatically equate to the lack of an interest of such funds). Adding to the maelstrom of
confusion, some courts seem to ignore control entirely. See Stingley v. AlliedSignal, Inc. (In
re Libby Int'l, Inc.), 247 B.R. 463, 469 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000) (ruling that it is net effect of the
transfer on the estate, and not debtor's control over transferred funds, that is dispositive in
deciding whether earmarking doctrine applies to prevent transfer from being avoided as
preference, but earmarking does not apply when there is no new creditor); see also supra

notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
203. See Weisberg, supra note 40, at 4 (describing the preference law as "one of the most
unstable categories of bankruptcy jurisprudence.").
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Thus, it should be no surprise that the jurisprudence regarding
the scope of the earmarking exception is equally, if not indeed more,
jumbled and confused. Finding a way out of the thicket requires
identifying certain critical points of reference-representational
beacons if you will-and then keeping them firmly in sight as the
analysis proceeds. For purpose of this treatment it is proposed that
diminution of the estate and equality of distribution among creditors
with similar rights might profitably serve as those beacons. The
former, because of its determinative connection to the very concept
of a voidable preference2 0 4 and because it is the one theme most
common to the various approaches and tests identified above for
circumscribing the reach of the earmarking doctrine. The latter
because of its causal relationship to the former as well as its centrality
to overall bankruptcy policy. 205 Consequently, while there may be, as
noted, prudential considerations that argue in favor or against a
bankruptcy court's application of the earmarking doctrine in a given
case, there is no sure-fire, definitive litmus test, and its absence should
not be reason for lament.
In attempting to offer an alternative strategy for delineating
the scope of the earmarking doctrine, it might, initially, be helpful
to establish the clear, diametrical extremes. First, there can be no
serious doubt about the fact that there is some field of operation for

.

204. See Warsco v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 258 F.3d 557, 564 n.11 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting,
in relation to the "interest of the debtor in property" language of § 547(b): "We have recognized in the past that diminution of the debtor's estate is not an element of the preference
statute. See In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527, 1536 n.13 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied sub nom. Baker
& Schultz, Inc. v. Boyer, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992). However, we also have recognized that 'the
'diminished estate' element of a preferential transfer is consistently applied,' and we previously have refused to disturb its application. Id. In keeping with our prior precedent and
that of other circuits, we continue to consider whether the transfer in question diminished
the debtor's estate."); see also In re Southmark Corp., 49 F.3d 1111, 1117 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that "the primary consideration in determining if funds are property of the debtor's estate
is whether the payment of those funds diminished the resources from which the debtor's
creditors could have sought payment."); In re Kemp Pac. Fisheries, Inc., 16 F.3d 313, 316
(9th Cir. 1994) (explaining the earmarking doctrine on the basis that the transaction in question merely substituted one creditor for another without diminishing the value of the bankruptcy estate); Litton v. Apperson Crump, PLC, 580 B.R. 686, 689 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2018)
(the fundamental inquiry is whether the transfer diminished or depleted the estate); Kelley
v. McCormack (In re Mitchell), 548 B.R. 862, 877 (M.D. Ga. 2016) (expressing disapproval
over the conflating of the diminishment of the estate criterion that inheres in the definition
of "transfer of an interest of the debtor in property" for purposes of both §§ 547 and 548 with
the "diminution" requirement inferred in the application of § 547(b)(5), and noting the trustee must prove both) (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY, supra note 30, at ¶ 547.03[2] n.29);
infra note 264
205. See supra note 2. The maxim of equality of distribution among similarly-situated
claims was also a basic norm of the 1898 Act; see also Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 29
(1952) ("[t]he theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution"').
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an earmarking doctrine.2 06 This means that there is a general
consensus that the language of the preference statute alone does not
supply the rule of decision in every case. Even the most circumscribed
formulation of the earmarking concept would have it apply in the
case where the new creditor is a codebtor on the obligation discharged
with the funds supplied by the new creditor. 207 Moreover, whether
relying on constructive trust or other fiduciary capacity fictions,2 08
nearly all courts that address the issue agree that application of
the doctrine is not negated in that situation by the fact that the
funds technically pass through the debtor's hands or otherwise come
under its sway. 209
On the other extreme, it is equally clear, even when the source
of the funds is a codebtor, that if the debtor has unfettered control
over the funds from the new creditor and those funds are not (or are
not intended) to be restricted in at least some fashion, whether by the

206. See Smith v. Suarez (In re IFS Fin. Corp., 417 B.R. 419, 435-36 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2009), aff'd, 669 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2012) ("The earmarking doctrine is widely accepted in
the bankruptcy courts as a valid defense against a preference claim ...

").

207. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
208. McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 56566 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that in the guarantor situation, even when the funds are put in
the debtor's possession, courts have in some instances employed notions of "trust" and "fidu-

ciary capacity" to avoid reaching the conclusion that the funds represented an interest of the
debtor in property). The constructive trust device bears many similarities with the earmarking doctrine. It, too, is an equitable remedy that essentially imposes a trust-like duty on a
party in possession of property in which another has a superior claim. See William L. Rothschild, How to Treat Constructive Trust Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 Nov. AM. BANKR. INST. J.
24 (2016) (describing the constructive trust remedy as implementing the following principle:
"If I hold legal title to a property but did something bad to get it, a court of equity may rule
that that the person I took the property from retained an equitable interest from the moment
of taking, and awards that person both the property and any profits or proceeds that I received while I held it."). In the preference context, the theory is that the funds transferred
by the debtor justly belonged to another and, thus, should not be regarded as property in
which the debtor had an interest for purposes of § 547(b). Thus, many preference cases where
the earmarking defense is raised also involve claims based on constructive trust theories.
See, e.g., Halperin v. Moreno (In re Green Field Energy Servs., Inc.), 2015 WL 5146161, Case
No. 13-12783(KG) (Bankr. D. Del., Aug 31, 2015); see also Benzaki, supra note 199, at 49093 (advancing the position that courts should expand the scenarios where the earmarking
doctrine might be pressed into service by using the "more liberal standard" adopted by courts
for ascertaining when a constructive trust will be deemed to exist).
209. For example, the standard established by the court in Bohlen, 859 F.2d at 566, could
be satisfied despite the funds coming under the debtor's control. See supranotes 155-57 and
accompanying text; see also Campbell v. Hanover Ins. Co. (In re ESA Envtl. Specialists), 709
F.3d 388, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2013) (allowing that that the earmarking defense applies either
when "the proceeds of the new loan are transferred directly by the lender to the old creditor,
or are paid to the debtor with the understanding that they will be paid to the creditor in
satisfaction of his claim so long as the proceeds are clearly earmarked"). But see Buchwald
Cap. Advisors v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006) (finding that a debtor's exercise of control over funds, even for if only for a brief period,
will defeat earmarking).
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creditor supplying the funds or otherwise," then such funds represent
an interest of the debtor in property (i.e., a new loan) that, within
the preference period, must be preserved to assure that the principle
of ratable distribution is not compromised due to a diminution of
the value of the estate that is created upon the debtor's subsequent
bankruptcy filing. So, on the outer extremes, there is accord as to
certain scenarios where the doctrine definitely applies and other fact
settings when it unquestionably does not. The obvious challenge is how
to manage the cases that fall in-between those two poles in a manner
that not only promotes equitable results in each such case but that, in
the aggregate, also provides for the development of a more coherent
and consistent jurisprudence in relation to the earmarking defense.
A.

The Weaknesses in the
Codebtor Requirement

'

The line of authority that would restrict utilization of the earmarking doctrine to situations where the funds at issue come from a
2
guarantor or other codebtor are misguided in a number of respects.
First, as noted earlier, the explanation for the limitation belies the
rationale for the exception. 212 Stated another way, if there is no room
for an equitable exception to the supposedly unambiguous language of
the statute, then it is difficult to understand why concerns over the
inequity of a codebtor potentially being subject to double liability
should warrant invocation of an exception in that circumstance but
213
none others.

Second, it is, in point of fact, difficult to see how the codebtor
would actually end up with double liability. To illustrate, assume, well
outside the preference period, Ivanov guaranties Popov's obligation
to Vasiliev. Both the Popov debt and the Ivanov guarantee are
unsecured. If Popov files for bankruptcy while the obligation to
Vasiliev remains outstanding, Vasiliev has a claim against the estate
for the amount of the debt that is entitled to share pari passu in any
distributions on behalf of unsecured claims. Ivanov would also have a
claim that is based on his right to reimbursement should he discharge
210. See Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1361 (5th Cir.
1986), reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that new creditor's failure to restrict the funds not fatal to application of the earmarking doctrine).
211. It has also been argued that these are not truly earmarking cases because when the
surety pays the old creditor the surety is satisfying its own independent obligation to the old
creditor, not extending new unsecured credit to the debtor. Carlson & Widen, supra note 88,
at 603-604.
212.

See supra text accompanying note 117.

213. A further flaw in that reasoning is the implicit assumption that there is no risk of
a similar inequity when the new lender is not already a codebtor. See supra note 37.

380

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:337

the obligation to Vasiliev under Ivanov's contract of guaranty."
However, Ivanov's claim is contingent until he actually makes good
on the guaranty. Under Code § 502(e)(1)(B), that contingent claim is
disallowed because there should only be a single recovery from the
estate with respect to what, as a practical matter, is only a single
obligation. Now, if we assume Ivanov paid Vasiliev in full before
the filing of Popov's petition, then, under § 502(e)(2), Ivanov's claim
would no longer be contingent and, thus, would be allowed, 2" but
there's no threat of a double recovery because Vasiliev, having been
paid, no longer has a claim.
Next, we add to the mix that, prior to filing but during the
preference period, Ivanov transferred funds to Popov solely for the
purpose of, and restricted to, paying the obligation to Vasiliev, and
that's exactly what happened. If the trustee is able successfully to
recover the payment from Vasiliev as a preference because all of the
other elements of § 547(b) are satisfied how is Ivanov prejudiced?
The thinking, presumably, is that now Vasiliev, having paid back
the preference, will go after (seek collection) from Ivanov and, if
Popov's case is a no-asset case, 216 then Ivanov will have effectively paid
the obligation twice. 1 7 What this postulated chain of events ignores
is that the original payment from Ivanov to Vasiliev, whether directly
or through Popov, should have discharged Ivanov's obligation under
the contract of guaranty. 218 Upon return of the preference, Vasiliev
will have a prepetition, unsecured claim against Popov's estate. 219
Thus, all that has really transpired is that Vasiliev has been

214. This follows from the Code's broad definition of "claim" in § 101(5)(A).
215. See generally In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 146 B.R. 98, 102 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992).
216. No-asset cases are hardly uncommon in Chapter 7. See Ed Flynn, Chapter 7Asset
Cases and Trustee Compensation, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2014, at 48-49 (noting that
in most states the amount of cases that are asset cases is below five percent). Moreover, even
if there is some distribution for general creditors, unless they are paid 100 cents on the dol-

lar, Ivanov would still end up paying more than the face value of the obligation. Full-pay
liquidations are exceedingly rare.
217. Manchester v. First Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 646 (10th Cir. B.A.P.
2000) (pointing out that courts have applied the earmarking exception in codebtor cases "be-

cause if the transfer [is] avoided, the codebtor would be subject to double liability.").
218. For example, in the case of a negotiable instrument, payment by a party with liability thereon, which would include a surety, operates to discharge the party making such
payment. See UCC § 3-601, 602. The fact that the payment is clawed back by the trustee in
the debtor's bankruptcy case does not automatically reinstate the obligation to the common
creditor.

219. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), allowing as a claim against the estate the amount paid by a
party who has repaid a preferential transfer under § 550(a).
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substituted for Ivanov in the bankruptcy case and will end up
suffering the loss for the entire obligation, and Vasiliev will have
been deprived of the benefit of its guaranty.
For this reason, unless it is clear that the transfer from Ivanov to
Popov was truly an extension of new credit and not intended to satisfy
Ivanov's obligation under the existing guaranty, application of the
earmarking doctrine is necessary to avoid disrupting the real economic
nature of and allocation of risk associated with the transaction as
originally struck. Moreover, this can be done without adversely
affecting other unsecured creditors because, in substance, there has
been no diminution in the value of the debtor's assets; no fewer
coins in the piggy bank to pay the same number and amount of
claims. However, the point to be stressed is that employment of the
earmarking doctrine in this hypothetical, while perfectly appropriate,
was not necessary in order to prevent Ivanov from being exposed to
liability twice for the same obligation. In other words, the non-debtor
situation is different from the new creditor scenario to be sure, but
there is nothing intrinsic to the codebtor state of affairs that clamors
for a different construction of, or equitable exception to, the language
"interest of the debtor in property" only when the source of the funds
at issue comes from a party already obligated on the debt.
Additionally, cases applying the codebtor limitation assert that
when the new lender is a non-codebtor, utilization of the earmarking
doctrine provides no benefit to the new creditor or the debtor. Instead,
they claim it serves only to advantage the old creditor to whom no such
advantage is due or warranted.2 2 0 This explanation ignores the basic
point that it is "the diminution of the [debtor's] estate, not the unequal
payment to creditors, which is the evil sought to be remedied by the
22
The fact that one creditor has
avoidance of a preferential transfer."1
been preferred or is better off is irrelevant if nothing has been lost by
220 E.g., Davis v. Kice Indus., Inc., (In re WB Servs., LLC), 587 B.R. 548, 557 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2018) (citing Manchester v. First Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Moses), 256 B.R. 641, 647 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 2000)) (quoting McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.)),
859 F.2d 561, 566 (8th Cir. 1988)).
221. See, e.g., Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R. 682, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2014) (" '[T]he test of whether a preference has occurred is not what the creditor receives but
what the bankrupt's estate has lost because it is the diminution of the bankrupt's estate, not
the unequal payment to creditors, which is the evil sought to be remedied by the avoidance
of a preferential transfer.' ") (citing Va. Nat'l Bank v. Woodson, 329 F.2d 836, 840 (4th Cir.
1964), and quoted with approval in Texas Amer. Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329,
339 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Tex. Am. Bancshares v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329, 339 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing Va. Nat'l Bank v. Woodson (In re Decker), 329 F.2d 836, 839-40 (4th Cir. 1964); Campbell v. Hanover Ins. Co., 457 B.R. 452, 457 (W.D.N.C. 2011); Barreto v. Cooperativa de Ahorro
y Credito de Aguiadilla (In re Barreto), No. 14-08712 (ESL), 2018 WL 5883911, at * 5 (D.
P.R., Nov. 7, 2018); Ryan v. Andrews (In re Chrismer), No. 7-07-10201, 2008 WL 5157506,
at *2 (Bankr. N.M., Sept. 23, 2008); see also infra note 259.
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the estate.22 2 After all, the same indictment could be made of a creditor
that receives payment while the debtor was solvent, 22 3 but that
does not make the transfer preferential. In addition, focus on the
entitlement of the old creditor reestablishes into the dynamic an
unhealthy preoccupation with the culpability of the parties rather
than a more dispassionate focus on the impact on unsecured creditors
in the aggregate. 224 Finally, and perhaps most disquieting, these
cases also overlook the fact that failure to recognize a role for the
earmarking defense in certain non-codebtor cases may also be
prejudicial to the new creditor, as observed earlier in connection
with the discussion of WB Services.2 5 Thus, the codebtor limitation
is based on a faulty premise, and also mistakenly assumes that the
reasons that make application of earmarking exception proper in
the codebtor situation also make its application unwarranted in
non-codebtor circumstances. Altogether, a pretty muddled kettle of

fish.

222. For example, in Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2007),
the debtor's father lent him just over $100,000 to pay off a judgment creditor which had
obtained a show cause order to have the debtor held in contempt for failing to cooperate in
that creditor's efforts to locate assets with which to satisfy its judgment. Id. at 176. The loan
was accomplished, in part, by the father's taking over an $85,000 loan the debtor had secured
from a third party, secured by stock certificates with a value in excess of $100,000. Id. The
debtor delivered the loan proceeds to his lawyer who deposited them with the court registry
in order to pay the defendant. Id. at 175-76. The court concluded that there was no doubt
that the father had made the funds available for the sole purpose of paying defendant and
that the earmarking doctrine should apply even though the debtor had temporary possession
of the funds. Id. at 185. The court noted, however, the generally accepted exception in cases
where the new loan is secured. Id. at 176; see also supra note 18. However, even though the
father's debt was fully collateralized, because the lien obtained by the father entailed supplanting the $85,000 secured obligation, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court that the
net diminution of the estate occasioned by the transaction was limited to the difference between the loan amount and $85,000, representing the extent to which the father had encumbered theretofore unencumbered property. Id. at 186. Thus, the transfer could only be
avoided to the extent of approximately $15,000. See also Campbell v. Hanover Ins. Co., 457
B.R. 452, 457-58 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (applying the earmarking doctrine to insulate from preference liability a transfer made for the purpose of purchasing a letter of credit for the
defendant, which otherwise refused to issue future payment and performance bonds needed
by debtor for government construction contracts). But see Colbert v. Walters (In re
Wagenknecht), Adv. No 18-01018, 2019 WL 2353534 (10th Cir. B.A.P. June 4, 2019) (the
presence of the funds in the debtor's estate, no matter how fleeting, results in a diminution
of the estate from the perspective of other creditors).
223. The question of solvency under § 547(b) is measured at the time of the transfer
challenged as preferential. Thus, a debtor could be solvent on the eighty-ninth day before
filing and become insolvent thereafter, thus prompting the bankruptcy filing.
224. See supra text accompanying note 65.
225. See WB Servs., 587 B.R. at 557. As discussed supra note 37, the supposition that
the possibility of suffering an inequitable result from having to return a preferential payment only attains in the case of codebtors is flawed.
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B. Making Sense of the Chaos
Regardless of whether the so-called "new creditor" really is a new
creditor and not one already burdened with an independent obligation
to the old creditor, 226 the question becomes how to approach the
cases that fall between the two extremes of direct payment to the old
creditor with no involvement by the debtor, on the one hand, and
an unrestricted advance of funds directly to the debtor with no
understanding or concern over how the proceeds will be used, on the
other. The beginning of an answer may be found by going back over
eighty years to the Second Circuit's decision in Grubb v. General
Contract Purchase Corp.2 2 7 As discussed in some detail earlier, 2 28
the Grubb court found three separate transfers from three different
creditors to be protected under the earmarking doctrine. Yet, the basis
for so concluding differed in each case. In one transaction the funds
were actually deposited in the debtor's account, but the defendant was
paid by a check drawn by the new creditor on itself. 229 In another,
the funds were placed in the debtor's account, but the new creditor
accepted liability on an instrument drawn by the debtor on that
account and made payable to the defendant.23 0 Finally, in the third
case, the funds were paid directly to the defendant by the new creditor,
but that lender was indifferent about how the funds were to be utilized
3 1
and was simply doing the debtor's bidding.2
Thus, in analyzing the transfers, the court took into account
control, intent, method of payment, timing, and outcome, but no
one factor was alone or in combination with another necessarily
dispositive. Instead, the court's modus operandi might most
appropriately be described as ascertaining, based on the totality of
the circumstances with respect to each of the transfers under
scrutiny, if the policy objectives sought to be served by the
preference scheme were implicated.22 2 Were that not the case, it is
226. See supra note 103.
227. Grubb v. Gen. Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 119-36.
229. Grubb, 94 F.2d at 71-72.
230. Id. at 72.
231. Id.
232. In fairness, the opinion never expressly states that this is the exercise in which the
court is engaged, and Grubb is often-cited as turning on the question of "control." See In re
Kelton Motors, Inc., 153 B.R. 417, 425 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1993) ("In a nutshell, Grubb held that
funds not within the direct control of a debtor do not become property of the estate. Other
courts have reached similar conclusions, even where the new creditor did not pay the old
creditor directly but instead entrusted the funds to the debtor to pay the old creditor."). However, Grubb could just as easily be characterized as permitting application of the doctrine
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difficult to imagine how all three of the very disparate kind of
transactions in Grubb could have been protected under the
earmarking defense." 3 This makes a considerable amount of
sense since concepts like "control" and "intent" are inherently slippery,
with subtle shadings of difference from case-to-case, and, thus, not
truly capable of being applied consistently. 3 4 For instance, some
cases will regard the debtor as having control of funds if they are
not restricted in some fashion by the new creditor,2 3 5 while others
will focus on the level of physical control the debtor exercised over
the funds. 235 Still other cases minimize the importance of physical
control and instead fix attention on whether the debtor had the
ability to designate to whom the funds should be directed, regardless

despite the fact that the debtor had not only possession but also some control over the funds
in question. This highlights the awkwardness and disutility of using "control" as the standard. See infra text accompanying note 235. In any event, it is urged that Grubb is more
accurately described as applying a holistic "totality of the circumstances" test, not constrained by any one single factor.
233. The three transactions at issue were quite dissimilar in terms, inter alia, of who
made the payment, who had possession of the funds, the timing of the payments, the form of
payment, the intent of the new creditor, etc.
234. For example, in In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Baker & Schultz, Inc. v. Boyer, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992), a majority of the court felt that the
debtor had sufficient control to negate application of the earmarking doctrine. Id. at 153637. Judge Flaum agreed that control was the determining factor but dissented on the basis
that the debtor did not have possession over the funds long enough to constitute "control."
Id. at 1540 (Flaum, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 144, 162-63, & 203. Regarding the
lack of clarity regarding intent, see infra note 238 and accompanying text.
235. E.g., In re White, 600 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2019) (refusing to apply the
earmarking doctrine outside of the new lender context); Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R. 682, 700-03 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2014) (earmarking does not apply when there
is no new creditor substituted for an old creditor); Buchwald Cap. Advisors v. Metl-Span I,
Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that even if the
general contractor made a prepetition transfer of funds to a subcontractor with the expectation that, the subcontractor, who later became a Chapter 11 debtor, would use funds to pay
its indebtedness to supplier, the debtor did not borrow those funds, thus precluding application of the earmarking doctrine). But see supra note 300.
236. See, e.g., Sherman v. TBK Bank (In re Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.), No. 1634855-BJH, 2018 WL 4348049 at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., Sept. 7, 2018) (noting that courts in
the Fifth Circuit emphasize the level of control); Campbell v. Hanover Ins. Co., 457 B.R. 452,
457 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (concluding that the earmarking doctrine is not limited to situations
when the new lender makes a direct payment to the old creditor, but also when the funds
are placed in the debtor's account).
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of the intent of the new creditor.2 37 Finally, some cases emphasize
performance consistent with the parties' agreed intent, largely
irrespective of pre-transfer control.23
This crazy quilt underscores the fact that these concepts do not
themselves represent intrinsic values, but rather operate as blunt
instruments employed for purposes of determining if the purposive
goals sought to be achieved by the preference law are in play. Just
as the elements of a voidable preference have shifted, even though
imperfectly, 239 from ones focused on intent and culpability to ones
that concentrate on effect,240 so, too, should application of the earmarking doctrine, as gloss on one of those elements, ultimately revolve
around the true economic substance of the transaction and its
correspondence with preference policy. If the loan at issue would
not have been sought and/or granted but for the plan and desire to
retire another outstanding debt, and that is in fact what the loan
proceeds were used for, it would seem the inquiry should be at an
end.241 The need to parse the facts even more finely to ascertain if they
fit into some perceived, but inherently inexact, understanding of what
is meant by "dominion over," "control," and "intention" would seem a
waste of time-not to mention a waste of estate assets consumed in
needless, protracted litigation.
At its core, bankruptcy entails the need to balance the competing
interests of debtors and creditors and, quite often, to balance bankruptcy policy against other social policies that inevitably become

237. See, e.g., Parks v. FIA Card Servs. (In re Marshall), 550 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir.
2008) (earmarking "only applies when the lender requires the funds be used to pay a specific
debt"); Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1361 (5th Cir. 1986),
reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1986) (proving the third-party's intent is one way, but
not the exclusive method, for proving the debtor's lack of adequate control).

238. See McCuskey v. The Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d
561, 567-68 (8th Cir. 1988), discussed supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text; see also
Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171, 184 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that if the
new creditor does not impose a specific requirement as to the funds' use, they become part
of the estate and, as such, potentially subject to the trustee's avoidance powers).
239. See Ponoroff, Flight From Equality, supra note 7, at 335-36 (describing post-1978
amendments to the preference statute as reflecting a backsliding toward emphasizing cul-

pability rather than effect).
240. See supratext accompanying notes 42-47.
241. But see Colbert v. Walters (In re Wagenknecht), 2019 WL 2353534, Adv. No 1801018 (B.A.P. 10th Cir., June 4, 2019) (the presence of the funds in the debtor's estate, no
matter how fleeting, results in a diminution of the estate from the perspective of other creditors). Of course, Wagenknecht essentially reads the earmarking exception out of preference
analysis notwithstanding its long and widely-recognized existence.
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implicated in bankruptcy cases.242 Consequently, bankruptcy judges
are experienced, and, frankly, usually pretty good at, well, balancing.243 They are likewise accustomed to being presented with a dizzying
array of financial transactions, not infrequently designed to mask
in some manner, shape, or form, the true pecuniary essence and
commercial reality of the deal. 244 Moreover, even when there is no
gamesmanship afoot, some commercial transactions can just get
plain complicated, making it challenging at times to ferret out real
economic purpose or impact behind the opaque curtain shrouding
the deal. Thus, bankruptcy judges are also habituated in and quite

242. See, e.g., Troy A. McKenzie, JudicialIndependence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy
Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 754 (2010) (commenting that bankruptcy cases "routinely involve a wide range of subject matters beyond technical parsing of the Bankruptcy Code," and
that "[b]ankruptcy judges are often called upon to decide sensitive questions of social and
economic policy that garner the attention of the public and political actors."); Nancy B.
Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The Proper Role of the Bankruptcy Attorney, 70
IND. L.J. 783, 837-43 (1995) (highlighting several areas where bankruptcy policies encounter
and clash with other social policies).
243. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Employees, Pensions, and Governance in Chapter 11, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 1468, 1480 (2004) (discussing why bankruptcy judges are better suited than
most other judges to conduct the "delicate task" of balancing competing interests); Charles
Jordan Tabb, Emergency PreferentialOrders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 75, 114 (1991) (noting, in relation to Chapter 11 reorganizations, that bankruptcy judges
"operate in a legal and economic maelstrom," and that bankruptcy judges frequently have
"the difficult task of balancing" competing concerns "with little time for reflection.").
244. Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 529 (1998) (pointing out, as part of making the case for a bankruptcy court system staffed by Article III judges, that bankruptcy courts handle as broad a range of nonfederal, as well as federal, case law; indeed, probably a higher proportion than the Article
III courts). In a large Chapter 11 case, bankruptcy judges may be called upon to address such
difficult issues as modifying health or retirement plans affecting thousands of employees,
terminating collective bargaining agreements, resolving mass tort claims (including the
rights of future, unknown claimants), et cetera. All of these issues require a sensitive balancing of competing social, economic, and even political considerations. Indeed, the Code
often expressly calls in some instances for such balancing. For example, § 1114(g)(3) instructs the bankruptcy court to enter an order modifying payment of retiree benefits if,
among other things, "such modification is necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor, and all of the affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably, and is clearly favored by the balance of the equities." Even in the more
common non-big business case, bankruptcy judges routinely balance multiple factors that
pull in different directions. As just one example, in deciding whether to lift the automatic
stay in order to allow the continuation of litigation in a non-bankruptcy forum, the court
must consider a range of differing considerations that may or may not be relevant in each
case and that are not always entitled to equal weight. See, e.g., In re Sonnax Indus., Inc. v.
TRI Components Prods. Corp. (In re Sonnax Indus., Inc.), 907 F.2d 1280, 1286 (2d Cir. 1990)
(listing a dozen factors to be weighed in deciding whether litigation should be permitted to
continue in another forum) (citing In re Curtis, 40 B.R. 795, 799-800 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984));
see also Wiley v. Hartzler (In re Wiley), 288 B.R. 818, 822 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (setting forth
a 5-factor test); In re Preferred Underwriting Alliance, Inc., 351 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 2006) (setting forth a 10-factor test). Regardless of the actual number of factors to balanced, the point is that bankruptcy judges are quite familiar with the exercise.
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proficient at uncovering the real quiddity of particular transactions
regardless of how those transactions might on the surface have been
cast for one reason or another. 245
Preference cases generally involve a similar balancing of the bankruptcy law policy of equal distribution with the competing commercial
norm of finality or repose in market transactions. 4 These cases also
arise in an almost infinite number of factual milieus, ranging from
very simple to incredibly sophisticated transactions, and each is just
a piece in a larger mosaic. Therefore, rather than adopting one test
or another for determining when a transfer will be regarded as not
involving an interest of the debtor in property under the earmarking
exception, and potentially stifling deeper insight in the process, it is
proposed that these cases be resolved individually on their unique
facts. The exercise needs to be guided, however, by fixed attention
on the question of diminishment during the preference period of
the assets soon to become the bankruptcy estate, with its consequent
reverberation for equality of distribution. The point being, this
determination must occur in a reasoned and fluid way, not with an
inflexible adherence to form. It must also be accompanied by attention
to the considerations that tend to be discriminating talismans of
whether the court is faced with what is merely a pure pass through of
funds, on the one hand, or a new loan that truly adds to the coins in
the piggy bank, on the other.
C.

Diminutionof the Estate and
Indirect Preferences

It is submitted that the one constant in preference analysis is
that if payment to a creditor neither depletes the assets available
for distribution to unsecured creditors nor increases the liabilities of

245. For instance, getting down to the underlying economic substance of particular
transactions occurs in connection with actions seeking either the equitable subordination or
recharacterization of particular claims. See generally Ponoroff, supra note 189 (addressing
both doctrines).
246. McCoid, supranote 7, at 269 (speaking of the 90-day limit on the preference period).
Today, the issue tends to get played out in application of the ordinary course of business
defense in § 547(c)(2), which is intended to leave undisturbed normal financial transactions.
See Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 41 (2d Cir. 1996); H.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6329. Unfortunately, due to the expansion in the scope of the exception since the Code was originally
enacted, 547(c)(2) now represents a threat to the foundational equality aspiration of the preference law. See Ponoroff, Flight From Equality, supra note 7, at 354-65; see also supra text
accompanying note 65.
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the debtor, then it is not preferential.24 Some of the jurisprudence
surrounding so-called "indirect preferences" elucidates this point.
Under the Code, one of the elements of a preferential transfer is
that the transfer, among other things, have been made "to or for the
benefit of a creditor." 4 8 Thus, an avoidable preferential transfer may
be either direct or indirect, with the latter being one made to a third
party that benefits the defendant/creditor.
The most common example of an indirect preference is a payment
made by an insolvent debtor in satisfaction of a guaranteed, but
otherwise unsecured, obligation within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy. Although the payment is not made to or received by the
guarantor, it nevertheless benefits the guarantor since it operates
to terminate the guarantor's conditional liability to the preferred
creditor. 249 Conversely, if the payment had not been made, the
guarantor would have been a creditor in the debtor's ensuing
bankruptcy case with a contingent claim for the amount of the
underlying debt.2 10 Because the debtor's payment allowed a creditor
(the guarantor) to receive more than it would have received if the
payment had not been made, the payment is a preference and may be
recovered from either the transferee or the indirect beneficiary.2 1 1
Another example of an indirect preference, and the one that is
instructive for present purposes, occurs when the debtor arranges
for an existing unsecured obligation to be supported by a standby letter

247. This point was emphasized by Judge McMillian in his dissent in McCuskey v. Nat'l
Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters. Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 1988) (McMillian,
J. dissenting) (describing the inherent "logic" of the earmarking doctrine as protecting payments that neither decrease nor increase the liabilities of the debtor) (citing Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 18 F. Supp. 680, 682 (S. D. N.Y. 1937), aff'd 94 F.2d 70 (2d
Cir. 1938)); see also supra note 205 and infra note 260.
248. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (2012).
249. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Marine Bank Dane Co. (In re Prescott), 51 B.R. 751, 756
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985) (finding that a junior secured party that had guaranteed the debtor's
obligation to the senior lender received an indirect preference when the senior lender seized
the debtor's property to reduce the overall indebtedness). Note, the definition of transfer
under § 101(54) includes involuntary as well as voluntary transfers.
250. The Code defines "creditor" as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that
arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. §
101(10)(A) (2012). A claim, in turn, means a "right to payment," regardless of whether it is
contingent or noncontingent. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012). See also supra text accompanying
note 216.
251. Pursuant to Code § 550(a), the trustee is entitled to recover the amount of the preference from either the actual transferee or the party who was indirectly benefited by virtue
of the transfer.
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of credit.2 " If the creditor, as beneficiary under the letter, later draws
on the letter upon default by the debtor on the principal obligation, no
preference has occurred because the proceeds received when the draft
23
is honored represent property of the issuing bank, not the debtor.
Likewise, there has been no diminution in the value of the debtor's
unencumbered assets relative to claims against those assets or, upon
filing, the value of the estate. Instead, the issuer, who becomes a
creditor of the debtor when the draft by the beneficiary is honored,
has simply been substituted for the beneficiary in the debtor's later
bankruptcy case. At its core, the situation is identical to a prototypical
earmarking case.
A preference issue arises, if at all, at the time the letter of credit
is first issued and delivered to the creditor/beneficiary, assuming it
occurs during the preference period and the other statutory elements
are met. Specifically, if the debtor's contingent obligation to the issuer
is unsecured, then, as noted above, there has been no diminution
in the value of the estate or prejudice to other creditors. However,
if the back-up promissory note given by the debtor to the bank is
collateralized with the debtor's property (as it often is), then a preferential transfer has taken place and it may be recovered from the
creditor/transferee no differently than if the security interest had
been given directly to that creditor. 2 4 In this situation, a transfer of
252. The standby letter of credit functions differently from the commercial letter of
credit. The latter is used as a payment mechanism in the sale of goods transaction, particularly in international transactions; the former is used as essentially a kind of "guarantee"
against default on contractual obligations. The standby letter adds the obligation of the issuing bank to the obligation of the debtor to pay money. For example, a creditor may loan
money to a debtor on certain terms. Although the debtor will promise to repay the loan, the
creditor may, at the time of the original extension of credit or later, demand a greater assurance of repayment. One way to accomplish this is to have the debtor arrange for a bank to
issue in the creditor's favor an irrevocable standby letter of credit for the amount of the loan.
Then, if the debtor subsequently defaults on his payment obligation, the creditor can turn to
the bank for payment of the amount due. The standby letter of credit backs up the performance of a financial obligation-repayment of a loan-and thus functions as a kind of repayment guarantee. See generally Gerald T. McLaughlin, Standby Letters of Credit and Penalty
Clauses:An Unexpected Synergy, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 4 (1982).
253. See In re W. L. Mead, Inc., 42 B.R. 57, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re M. J. Sales
& Distrib. Co., 25 B.R. 608, 614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Douglas G. Baird, Standby Letters
of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 130 (1982); see also Boyd v. Sachs (In re Auto
Specialties Mfg. Co.), 153 B.R. 510, 519 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993) (payment on a letter of
credit is not a preference unless it results in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the assets of the
estate).
254.

E.g., Metro Commc'ns, Inc. v. Pacific-10 Conference (In re Metro Commc'ns, Inc.),

115 B.R. 849, 854 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that an indirect transfer for purposes of
§ 547(b) occurs when the debtor pledges its assets to a third party as collateral in exchange
for the third party's issuance of a letter of credit for the benefit of another existing creditor
of the debtor). As a practical matter, a secured obligation has been substituted for an unsecured obligation, which is preferential. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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an interest in property of the debtor, consisting of the collateral
pledged to the issuing bank in order to secure the letter, occurs when
the letter of credit is issued for the indirect benefit of the creditor.
When the letter is later paid, the result of the transaction is that a
secured obligation has been substituted for an unsecured one, and,
consequently, the distributable estate diminished proportionately.2 55
The letter of credit beneficiary profited, albeit indirectly, upon the
letter's issuance and, assuming insolvency, to the prejudice of other
unsecured creditors. 5 6 The key point of distinction and difference
between the two transactions (i.e., obligation to issuer secured or
unsecured) is the totemic diminution concept with its corresponding
impact on ratable distribution.
By the same token, the pivotal point of similarity between the
stand-by letter of credit scenario and the earmarking doctrine is the
impact of the transactions on the distributive ideals of the bankruptcy
system. Even if a transfer meets the formal definition of a preference
based on an expansive definition of an interest of the debtor in
255. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton
Corp.) exemplifies the analysis. The debtor, Compton, arranged the issuance of a $585,000
letter of credit from MBank for the benefit of a supplier, Blue Quail that had previously
delivered an oil shipment to Compton, the payment for which was delinquent. As is customary, Compton paid a fee for the issuance of the letter and executed a backup demand note
payable to MBank in the face amount of the letter. Since MBank already had a blanket security interest in Compton's assets under a security agreement containing an all obligations
clause, the demand note was automatically secured. The day after the issuance of the letter,
an involuntary petition was filed against Compton. Several weeks later, MBank honored a
$569,000 draft drawn by Blue Quail. MBank added that amount to its secured claim in
Compton's bankruptcy case and, because sufficient value existed in the collateral, its total
claim was paid in full. Subsequently, the trustee sued Blue Quail in order to recover the
$569,000 transfer as a preference. The bankruptcy court granted Blue Quail's motion for

summary judgment on the basis that the payment under the letter involved a transfer of
MBank's property and did not constitute a transfer of the debtor's property. The district
court affirmed on this ground and added that the increase in MBank's secured claim did not
change the analysis since the transfer was for the sole benefit of the bank and in no way
benefited Blue Quail. The Fifth Circuit reversed and permitted recovery against Blue Quail.
The court observed that even though the offending transfer was made to MBank, the effect
of the transaction was to commit the estate's assets to the repayment of an unsecured, antecedent debt within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing. See generally In re Compton Corp., 831
F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1987).
256. Am. Bank v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc.), 55 B.R. 157, 159
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (finding that a preference had occurred where, within ninety days
prior to bankruptcy, a letter of credit was issued to a creditor on account of an antecedent
unsecured debt and the debtor gave collateral to the issuing bank), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
72 B.R. 657 (S.D. Fla. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 845 F.2d 293 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 993 (1988). For an example of an indirect preference case involving an earmarking challenge, see generally Campbell v, Hanover Ins. Co., 457 B.R. 452 (W.D.N.C. 2011)
(involving a loan made to the debtor to permit the debtor to obtain a letter of credit for the
benefit of the defendant that had refused to issue new payment and performance bonds unless the debtor obtained the letter of credit to assure repayment of its outstanding indebtedness).
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property, if the net impact on general creditors is benign, there is
no sound policy basis to force recovery of the payment in question;
indeed, to do so serves no purpose other than to vindicate the unsavory
goal of exalting form over substance. The earmarking defense, by
deformalizing the statutory definition of a voidable preference in
appropriate circumstances sidesteps this displeasing outcome.
VII.

DIMINUTION AS THE TOUCHSTONE FOR THE
EARMARKING DOCTRINE

A.

An Alternative Standard

At the time the Code was adopted, some commentators opined that
the diminution of the estate understanding of a voidable preference
no longer had any place in the analysis under the new bankruptcy
law and that its continued application would serve only to undermine
the structural integrity of § 547.257 Just as the argument that the
earmarking doctrine did not survive enactment of the Code met with
little success ,28 rumors of the death of the diminution doctrine were
greatly exaggerated as well. Courts have continued routinely to
employ the doctrine as a mechanism for explaining why particular
transactions contravene foundational bankruptcy purposes,5 9 as well
as use the conceptualization of diminution of the estate (or the to
be formed estate) as a benchmark for discriminating between those
transfers that are subject to avoidance under § 547 from those that

257. See Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In Defense of the Bankruptcy Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial Financing, 61 WASH. U. L.Q.
1, 57 (1983) (criticizing the doctrine as inimical to the Code's attempt to encapsulate preference law in a closed universe of rule and exception); see also Carlson & Widen, supra note
88, at 592 ("Section 547(c)(1) has displaced the pre-Code common law doctrine that a trustee
can only recover to the extent of 'diminution of the estate'-a notion that is even older than
its adoption in the earmarking doctrine.").

258. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
259. While not explicitly incorporated into the Code's formulation of a preferential transfer, the diminution of the estate concept has retained its vitality in Code cases. See, e.g.,
Hansen v. MacDonald Meat Co. (In re Kemp Pac. Fisheries, Inc.), 16 F.3d 313, 316 (9th
Cir.1994) (stating that the diminution doctrine has been developed to determine whether
property transferred by the debtor belongs to the debtor for § 547 purposes); Laker v. Vallette
(In re Toyota of Jefferson, Inc.), 14 F.3d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining application of
the subsequent advance rule in § 547(c)(4) to shield an otherwise avoidable transfer from
preference recovery on the ground that the effect of the transactions between the debtor and
the creditor occasioned no diminution of the estate, and thus did not harm other creditors);
see also Buckley v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (In re Interior Wood Prods. Co.), 986 F.2d 228, 231 (8th
Cir. 1993) (holding that, although there is no express statutory requirement, most courts
have found a diminution of the estate requirement implicit in the language of the statute);
In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527, 1535 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[C]ourts have also long held that to be
avoidable, transfers must result in a depletion or diminution of the debtor's estate."), cert.
denied sub nom. Baker & Schultz, Inc. v. Boyer, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992).
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are not.2 6 0 Despite the appeal and perhaps even the systemic benefits
that might flow from application of a purely mechanistic rule, it is
impossible to deal in a consistent, principled way with the variety of
transactions that give rise to preference issues without resort to the
essential consequential objective. It is a central tenet of this Article
that the joining of equality policy with the diminution notion helps
keeps us, if not pointed with precise aim to that objective in preference
cases, at least moving in the right direction.
Without question, certain defenses in § 547(c), most notably the
ordinary course of business exception in § 547(c)(2), devitalize the
equality aims served by the definition of a voidable preference in
§ 547(b).2 6 1 Several other defenses, however, are explicable directly
in terms of the diminution of the estate gloss on that definition in
§ 547(b).262 These include the substantially contemporaneous exchange
exception in subdivision (c)(1), the enabling loan defense in (c)(3),
the subsequent advance of new value exception in subdivision (c)(4),
and the floating liens safe harbor in subdivision (c)(5). All of these
exceptions it should be noted were part of the Code when enacted, 6
and each in some fashion or another identify and safeguard transactions that really have no preferential effect in the sense of making
the plight of unsecured creditors any worse off as a consequence of
transactions occurring during the preference period. Thus, it's easy to
see the iterative linkage of the diminution abstraction with the very
conception of when and why a particular transfer does or does not
implicate the preference law.
Because of the equality imperative, although a preferential transfer
operates to the benefit of the recipient-creditor, that fact alone is
not sufficient to render the transfer voidable as a preference. The
barometer for determining if a preference has occurred is based not on
what the transferee/creditor receives but rather on what the debtor's
260. Dubis v. Heritage Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Kenosha Liquidation Corp.), 158 B.R. 774,
779 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993) (stating that a diminution of the estate is the paramount consideration in determining whether a preferential transfer has occurred). But see Weisberg,

supra note 40, at 128 (suggesting that "[a] good number of cases flatly reject the ... doctrineor its underlying sentiment").
261. Supra note 65; see Ponoroff, Flight From Equality, supra note 7, at 361 (referring
to the defense in § 547(c)(2) as the exception that threatens to "consume[] the rule" and as
"the undisputed darling of the credit industry"); Tabb, supra note 7, at 1035 (advocating
repeal of section 547(c)(2) as undermining the operation of preference law as a rule of strict
liability); see also Skeel, supranote 8, at 720 ("Much of the leakage in current preference law
can be traced to the expansiveness of the safe harbor for payments made in the ordinary
course of business.").
262. Ponoroff, Flight From Equality, supra note 7, at 342 (describing these exceptions as
meeting the technical definition of a preference, but not having preferential effect in the
sense involving transactions that they do not result in a diminishment of the estate).
263. See Countryman, supra note 7, at 758-59.
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estate (and, derivatively, the debtor's general creditors) has lost; there
can be no preference if the property or property interest transferred

is not property in which the debtor had an equitable interest. 2 " Therefore, the cases that cite an unearned advantage enjoyed by the creditor
receiving the payment as reason not to apply the earmarking doctrine
miss the point.2 6 1
Similarly, although it is routinely (if not universally) the practice,2 6 6
it is proposed that it is unwise to overlay in a hyper-technical, reflexive
fashion the expansive definition of property of the estate in § 541(a) on
to the language in § 547(b) concerning an interest of the debtor in
property.2 6 7 Because of the effect that the filing of a bankruptcy petition has in separating a debtor's pre- and post-petition financial life
once the case has been commenced, 268 it is necessary and appropriate
to go to great pains to assure that all of the property in which the
debtor has a legal or equitable interest of any kind will be applied to
payment of prepetition debts. However, in the period prior to filing,
including during the applicable preference periods, fluctuations in the
value of the debtor's assets may and typically do occur on a regular
basis. These are not always problematic, as reflected by certain

-

264. See Moser v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R. 682, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
2014). See also Wind Power Sys., Inc. v. Cannon Fin. Grp. (In re Wind Power Sys., Inc.), 841
F.2d 288, 292 (9th Cir. 1988) ("An exchange that does not take value away from the debtor's
estate cannot be a transfer within the reach of section 547."); In re Tenderloin Health, 849
F.3d. 1231, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) ("The pertinent question is whether the deposit depletes the
assets of the estate available for distribution to creditors."); see also supra notes 222, 259. To
be clear, that there was a diminution of a debtor's assets relates to the determination of
whether a transfer of a debtor's interest in property had preferential effect, and not to
whether the "greater amounts test" is satisfied. Kelley v. McCormack (In re Mitchell), 548
B.R. 862, 876-77 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2016) (holding that the analyses of whether an interest
of the debtor in property for purposes of the earmarking doctrine and if the greater amount
test has been satisfied are separate and independent.); see also Rainsdon v. Am. First
Fed. Credit Union, Adv. Proceeding No. 16-8034-JDP, 2017 WL 4158329 at *5 (Bankr. D. Id.
Sept. 18, 2017). Professor Countryman had a slightly different slant on the relationship between the diminution doctrine and the greater amount test of § 547(b)(5). See supra note 58.
265. See supra notes 38, 222 and accompanying text; see infra note 285 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 114. See also In re Mitchell, 548 B.R. at 875 ("[In determining
whether a transaction constituted a transfer of the interest of the debtor in property," of the
kind potentially subject to avoidance as preference or fraudulent transfer, a bankruptcy
court "must find that the debtor disposed of or parted with rights that he had in property,
[with] such rights being defined by state law unless altered by applicable federal law or a
countervailing federal interest.").

267. See also infra text accompanying notes 288-92. Of course, the case law is in decided
disagreement with this proposition. E.g., Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.),
97 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1996).
268.

See Lawrence Ponoroff, Neither 'Twixt nor 'Tween: Emerging Property Interests in

Bankruptcy, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 101, 102 (2019) ("[E]ntry of the order for relief in a bankruptcy
case operate to hew a distinct and largely impenetrable barrier between the debtor's preand postbankruptcy lives.").
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preference defenses that rest on the fact that there was not a net
diminution of the value of the estate measured at two points in time:
the 90th day prior to filing (or one year in the case of insiders) and
the date of filing, even though there may have been wild fluctuations
in the amount of the debtor's unencumbered assets in-between. 6 9
The earmarking doctrine similarly operates as an exception, albeit
equitable and not statutory, when the property transferred represented funds that, while perhaps appearing to be property of the
debtor, were, in fact, always destined to be applied in retirement of
the obligation due to a specifically identified creditor. Thus, as in
the case of other statutory exceptions, the effect of the transfer is
essentially neutral insofar as the distributable unencumbered assets
are ultimately concerned.2 70
This is why the fact that the assets in question may be (or upon
filing would become) property of the estate under the language of
§ 541(a) should not automatically preclude an earmarking argument
based on events occurring at an earlier point in time. Instead, the focus
should be on the analysis of whether a prefiling transfer operated to
the prejudice of unsecured creditors as a whole by reducing the coins
in the piggy bank without a corresponding reduction of claims against
those coins.271 After all, that is the original justification for the doctrine

269. Of course, the defense in § 547(c)(5) for floating liens on inventory and receivables
is the most familiar example of this, but the "subsequent advance" rule in § 547(c)(4) similarly ignores fluctuations in the amount of the preference during the 90-day period.
270. The closest analogy is constructive trust theory, under which a party that holds
property as to which another party has a superior equitable claim, will be deemed, by operation of law, rather than consent, to hold such property in trust for the benefit of the second
party. See generally Benzaki, supra note 199, at 487-90; William L. Rothschild, How to Treat
Constructive Trust Claims in Bankruptcy, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2016, at 24. Once
property is made subject to a constructive trust, it becomes excluded from the property of
the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) excludes from the property of the estate assets as to which the
debtor holds bare legal, but not equitable title. Given the similarities, it is not uncommon for
both the earmarking doctrine and constructive trust theory to be raised as alternative defenses in response to a preference action. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan),
503 F.3d 171, 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming lower court's partial allowance of the earmarking defense, but concluding that the facts did not support imposition of a constructive
trust); In re Mitchell, 548 B.R. at 880-83; see also supra note 209.
271. The preference law is intended to prevent a net diminishment of the debtor's assets
available for distribution to unsecured creditors in the 90 days preceding the filing. Thus, if,
as a practical matter, the transaction under scrutiny did not have this effect, regardless of
how the property might be classified once the case is actually filed, its transfer should not be
regarded as a preference. E.g., Whitmore v. Innovation Ventures, LLC (In re Lopez Roman),
599 B.R. 87, 97 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that the test is not simply whether any
interest was transferred, but rather whether there is a diminishment of " 'the fund to which
creditors of the same class can legally resort for the payment of their debts' ") (citing Adams
v. Anderson (In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co.), 223 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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in the first place. 27 2 Moreover, its application does not exceed the limits
placed on the bankruptcy courts' equitable jurisdiction in Law v.
Siegel, because § 541(a) defines the estate as of the commencement of
the case, and not some prior point in time. 273
This observation suggests that the tortured and, in the end,
pointless preoccupation exhibited in some cases over whether the
debtor had control of the funds or authority over their disposition is
misguided.2 7 4 Application of the earmarking doctrine should turn on
whether the purpose for the new credit accommodation was to satisfy
an existing debt and whether the funds were in fact so used prior to
filing. In this connection, it also should not matter necessarily whether
the intent to restrict application of the funds to that specific purpose
was held by the new creditor or the debtor, so long as it can be shown
that this was one or the other's intention from the outset.2 75 Instead,
the core question for the court in these cases should be, looking at the
totality of the circumstances, can the old creditor demonstrate that the
transfer under challenge was from funds that were either intended to
be used to pay off that old creditor's debt, or, if not, that they were
sufficiently "restricted" such that it is unlikely that they would have
been used by the debtor for any other purpose. 276 Of course, in all
of these cases, we already know that the funds were used for that
purpose.

272. The court in Sherman v. TBK Bank (In re Dependable Auto Shippers, Inc.), No. 1634855-BJH, 2018 WL 4348049, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2018) makes this point by
noting that if the funds have been entrusted to the debtor to pay a specific debt, they never
really become property of the estate. The court, however, like most others, ruled that the
phrase "interest of the debtor in property" should be understood as consistent with the definition in § 541(a) of "property of the estate." This position overlooks the fact that, unless the
entrusted funds are still in the debtor's possession or under its control as of the filing date,
they are not property of the estate where they have been transferred consistent with the
earmarking designation. At that point, the trustee's recourse, if any, should be the constructive trust theory and not preference liability.
273. The limits of this statement exist where, even though there is technically no net
diminution of the estate, the Code specifically calls for a different result based on when the
transfer is deemed to have occurred. This is why the earmarking doctrine has found little
purchase in the context of a secured refinancing with a delayed recordation of the new lien.

.

See infra Section VI.D.
274. See supra note 203.
275. This is consistent with the holdings in Coral Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque ParibasLondon, 797 F.2d 1351, 1361, 1364 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 801 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1986)
and Grubb v. Gen. Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F. 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1938). See supra text accompanying notes 101, 131-33, and 233.
276. In re Dependable Auto, 2018 WL 4348049, at *7-8 (specifically considering the "totality of the circumstances" with the goal of assuring the "'substance over form approach' .
. assess[es] claims of the earmarking defense").
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The gravamen of this suggested approach is to ensure that the outcome corresponds with underlying economic substance and reality.17
If the defendant can demonstrate that the funds were supplied by the
new creditor specifically for purposes of retiring that creditor's debt,
and that's indeed what happened, the defense should prevail, plain
and simple.2 7" Alternatively, if the defendant cannot establish intention, but can show either through direct evidence or circumstantially
that the funds were earmarked in a fashion that provides confidence
that they were from the get-go always advanced for the purpose of
satisfying the debtor's obligation to the defendant that, too, should be
enough to sustain the earmarking defense. 279
B.

Operationof the New Standard

So, let's return to the hypothetical used earlier where Popov is
indebted to Vasiliev on an unsecured obligation, but, in this case, there
is no surety. Instead, Ivanov is truly a "new creditor." If the payment
to Vasiliev occurs during the preference period, and all of the other
elements of § 547(b) are satisfied, the trustee should be able to
meet his or her burden of establishing a prima facia case. For Vasiliev
then to defend successfully based on the earmarking exception to the
277. See Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1359 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying the earmarking defense based on debtor's possession of funds as it would elevate form over substance). By the
same token, the form of the transaction should not be used to create the appearance of an
earmarking situation when, in fact, one does not exist. See Rieser v. Bruck Plastics Co. (In
re Trinity Plastics, Inc.), 138 B.R. 203, 208 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (ruling that the court
should avoid formalistic applications of the earmarking doctrine and, based on analysis of
the underlying circumstances, focus on whether the transfers in question diminished the
value of the debtor's estate).

278. In the situation where the funds transferred derived from a sale of unencumbered
assets, the earmarking doctrine would not preclude characterizing the transfer as a preference since there is no "new creditor," and thus no replacement of the assets transferred. See
Feldman v. People First Fed. Credit Union (In re White), 600 B.R. 335, 340 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2019) (rejecting application of the earmarking doctrine where no new lender exists); Moser
v. Bank of Tyler (In re Loggins), 513 B.R. 682, 700-03 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2014). This result
does not follow, however, where the asset(s) in question were fully encumbered prior to the
sale and the assumption of the liability is not in lieu of a higher purchase price that might
have redounded to the benefit of unsecured creditors. In effect, the circumstances mirror the

new creditor rationale insofar as the impact on the estate is concerned. See generally Cage
v. Wyo-Ben, Inc. (In re Ramba, Inc.), 437 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 2006), discussed infra note
301, wherein, in connection with the purchase of the debtor's drilling division, the purchaser
paid certain outstanding debts of the debtor to key suppliers and received the assets free and
clear of all liens. Because the purchase price and the assumed debts did not exceed total
amount due to the secured lender, payment of the amount of the assumed obligations to the
debtor would not have benefitted general creditors. Id. at 461.
279. This is where "control" might become a factor, but not in the manner necessarily
suggested by the court in Coral Petroleum, 797 F.2d at 1358-59 (distinguishing possession
from "general" control). The inherently slippery and nebulous meaning of the term "control,"

see supra note 203, limits its utility as a guiding concept. The alternative approach to proving
control or lack thereof is explored infra in Section VI.D.
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"interest of the debtor in property" requirement of the statute, it would
be incumbent on Vasiliev to demonstrate that Ivanov intended for,
and it was always understood that, his loan to Popov would be used
by Popov exclusively for the purpose of paying off the obligation to
Vasiliev. 280 Failing that, Vasiliev could still defend successfully by
showing either that the earmarked funds never passed through
Popov's hands or that, even though Popov had apparent unrestricted
possession of the funds briefly,28 1 they were obtained by Popov with the
intent of retiring Popov's obligation to Vasiliev, and that is precisely
what occurred. 2 2
If we remain guided by the twin beacons of diminution of the estate
and equality of distribution, there is no good reason why, in effect,
satisfaction of virtually any of the tests that have been bandied about
over the years 283 ought not to be sufficient to recognize the earmarking
defense. Once more, the question is not did the old creditor receive
more than it would have had the payment not occurred, which is the
focus of the greater amount test in § 547(b)(5), 21 but instead whether
unsecured creditors as a group were prejudiced by the transfer due to
the diminishment of the distributable estate. 2 5 From that perspective,
if there is clear proof that the new creditor extended the loan proceeds
only for the purpose of paying off a particular debt, or that the debtor
never intended to exercise its ability to designate the application of the
funds other than to payment of the old creditor's obligation, then what

280. Because the earmarking doctrine operates both as a defense and also relates to one
of the elements of the trustee's proof under § 547(b), there is some disagreement over who
bears the burden of proof. See supra note 51.
281. This was of course true with regard to one of the transfers at issue in Grubb v. Gen.
Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1938). See supra text accompanying
notes 122-28; see also Caillouet v. First Bank and Tr. (In re Entringer Bakeries, Inc.), 548
F.3d 344, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that, under Fifth Circuit precedent, possession does
not equate to control).

282. See, e.g., Adams v. Anderson (In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co.), 223 F.3d 1004, 1009
(9th Cir. 2000) (reversing decision of the bankruptcy court that had rejected an earmarking
defense on the basis that possession of the funds in question gave the defendant the power,
though not the right, to use the funds for a purpose other than the one for which the funds
had been advanced).
283. See text accompanying supra notes 191-202.
284. See supra notes 55, and 58-59 and accompanying text.
285. E.g., Wind Power Sys. Inc. v. Cannon Fin. Grp., Inc. (In re Wind Power Sys., Inc.),
841 F.2d 288, 292 (9th Cir. 1988); ("[a]n exchange that does not take value away from the
debtor's estate cannot be a transfer within the reach of section 547."); Campbell v. Hanover
Ins. Co. (In re ESA Envtl. Specialists Inc.) 709 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing circuit
precedent as the test being not unequal payment to creditors, but what the estate has lost);
see also supra notes 38, 222.
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transpired is the substitution of one unsecured creditor for another 6 ;
no harm, no foul. However, in the latter case, because of the difficulty
in many cases of actually proving the debtor's intent with any degree
of certainty or reliability (never mind economy), proof by circumstantial evidence ought to be permitted, and, in that connection, it is
proposed that a mechanism as simple and obvious as timing might be
used as a reliable proxy for intent.8 7
C.

Distinguishing§ 541(a) and § 547(b)

Before turning to that mechanism, it warrants reemphasizing
that a proper analysis may also require disaggregation of the broad
definition of the "property of the estate" under 541(a) once the
bankruptcy case is filed from the determination of an interest in
the debtor in property in advance of filing for purposes of § 547(b). 288
The expansive definition in § 541(a) serves a purpose that is not yet
implicated prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Specifically,
the former establishes the commencement of the case as the date of
cleavage for establishing the parties' respective rights in property,
thus implementing the rudimentary bankruptcy policy of separating
the debtor's pre and post-petition financial lives. 28 9 The widely
inclusive scope of the definition of property of the estate in § 541(a)
should be read and applied accordingly. 290

.

286. This assumes, of course, that the earmarked funds are used applied in accordance
with the condition imposed by the new lender. This proved to be a disabling factor in McCuskey v. Nat'l Bank of Waterloo (In re Bohlen Enters., Ltd.), 859 F.2d 561, 567 (8th Cir. 1988).
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
287. See infra text accompanying notes 294-95.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 266-73.
289. Porrett v. Hillen (In re Porrett), 564 B.R. 57, 66 (D. Idaho 2016) (opining that "commencement of the case 'sets a date of cleavage' and establishes the moment at which the
parties' respective rights in property must be determined.' ") (citations omitted)); In re Sturgis Iron & Metal Co., Inc., 420 B.R. 716, 749 n.63 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2009) ("[T]he entire
bankruptcy process is based upon a division in [t]ime, [sic] with claims that arose prepetition
against the debtor being treated in one manner and claims that arose against the estate
postpetition being treated in a different manner."); Siegel v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp (In re Indymac Bancorp Inc.), 2012 WL 1037481, at *12 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012) (noting that
the phrase "as of the commencement of the case" in § 541(a)(1) is intended to set a date of
cleavage for establishing the parties' respective rights in property).
290. See, e.g., Gladstone v. Bancorp, 811 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) ("The legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code reveals that the concept of property of the estate is to be
interpreted broadly.") (quoting Chappel v. Proctor (In re Chappel), 189 B.R. 489, 493 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1995)); Chartschlaa v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 538 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding that property of the estate for purposes of § 541(a) consists of "every conceivable
interest of the debtor, future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative, ..
[including] causes of action owned by the debtor or arising from property of the estate.")
(citation omitted).
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By contrast, when the issue is whether funds represented an
interest of the debtor in property in the context of an action to avoid a
prefiling payment, the language should be read and applied consistent
with the policies and purposes behind the preference law, most notably
equality of distribution and assuring that there is no diminishment
of (and also no artificial increase in) the size of the distributable estate
in relation to the debtor's unsecured creditors during the prefiling
preference period. 291 The earmarking doctrine is premised of course on
the fact that funds provided to the debtor to pay a specific indebtedness
are not recoverable as a preference because those dollars were
never meaningfully property of the debtor, so the transfer does not in
actuality disadvantage other creditors. In this context, property of the
debtor can and should be given a more flexible definition that takes
into account the equality policy that modern preference law was
conceived and tailored to serve. 292
D. A Temporal Limitation
The suggestion above to expand the scope of the earmarking
exception even in the non-codebtor situation if either (1) the new loan
was specifically extended with an understanding that the proceeds
would be used only to pay the old creditor and that is what occurred,
or (2) it can be demonstrated that the debtor had no intention of using
its control and dominion over the new loan proceeds other than to pay
off a specific debt, and that the loan was acquired for this purpose,
requires elaboration in relation to the later circumstance. In the first
scenario, proof will likely be available with relative ease from the new
lender's documentation of the transaction. 2 9 In the second context,
reliable proof of actual intent will often be difficult and costly to obtain.
Therefore, a neutral delegate needs to serve in its stead.
Borrowing a page from the preference law itself, it is proposed that
the most expedient surrogate would be a temporal one. As an example,
it might be sufficient to say that, in the absence of other direct evidence
of intent,2 94 in order for the new lender's funds to be regarded as
291. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
292. But see supra note 8.
293. If the extension of new credit is not an unconditional loan that might benefit all of
the debtor's creditors, the lender is likely to have some written evidence that the funds were
being advanced for the specific purpose of paying all or at least a position of a particular debt
owed by the debtor. This should be readily discoverable by the holder of that particular debt.
Failing that, it would be necessary to fall back on the debtor's intent as evidenced by its
failure to exercise control in the manner proposed below in this Section VI.B.
294. Such evidence might come in the form of proof of an agreement or understanding
between the debtor and the old creditor concerning the restricted use of the funds. See Coral
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"restricted," the payment to the old creditor must have occurred no
later than two business days from the date of the debtor's receipt of
the funds (or perhaps even a more truncated period of time; e.g.,
twenty-four hours), provided of course that the payment occurs
prior to the commencement of the debtor's bankruptcy case.2 9 Failing
that, the funds would be treated as unrestricted and truly a new loan,
meaning that any subsequent transfer would be of property as to
which the debtor, and its creditors, have an interest for purposes of the
preference law. A rule bounded by these parameters, while concededly
arbitrary, would have the benefit of setting a clear, bright line that
would be administratively simple to manage, unlike the inherent
complexity entailed in establishing at what point the debtor exercised
impermissible control. Moreover, it is frankly no more arbitrary than
the statutory 90-day preference period; sometimes we just need a line
and it matters rather less where we draw that line than that there be
a shared understanding of where it is drawn.
Even with this limitation, the earmarking exception as proposed
above would be more capacious in reach than any of the currently
existing standards or tests that have been proposed under the Code.
In fact, drawing the defense in this fashion would make it closest in
operation with the approach taken by Judge Hand in Grubb v. General
Contract Purchase Corp.296 While ensuring no prejudice to other
creditors, it would allow certain otherwise preferential transfer to
survive attack. In so doing, it would have the dual benefit of providing
a measure of protection to the old creditor, who perhaps detrimentally
relied on the payment in relinquishing certain rights or otherwise, 297
and, at the same time, could operate to throw a life-line to financiallystruggling debtors in some instances since, often, the old creditor
will be one that is asserting the most ardent collection pressure.
Substitution of the creditor inclined to put the screws to the debtor
with one presumably more placable and willing to give the debtor
time might just be enough to allow the debtor to stave off bankruptcy
entirely. Surely that is in the interests of all concerned and could

Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas-London, 797 F.2d 1351, 1361-63 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g
denied, 801 F.2d 338 (1986) (holding that failure to demonstrate intent to restrict the new
loan proceeds by the new lender was not fatal to the earmarking defense); see also supra note
143 and accompanying text. In this case, the court might allow a somewhat longer period of
time between receipt of the funds and payment of the old creditor before barring use of the
earmarking exception.

295. This is necessary of course because, upon the commencement of the case, such funds
would become estate property under 11 U.S.C § 541(a)(1) (2012) and subject to restriction
under the automatic stay of § 361.
296. 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938).
297. See supra note 37.
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actually make general creditors better off in the long run. However,
without the protection of a clear, and, frankly, more expansive
earmarking defense, the old creditor will have less incentive to give
the debtor the opportunity it needs to arrange alternative financing or
otherwise right the ship. 298
E. An Exclusion:
Delayed Recordation on Refinance
There is another factual situation that has arisen in several
reported decisions where the earmarking doctrine has been invoked in
an attempt to insulate an alleged preferential transfer from avoidance.
These are cases where the debtor has refinanced a secured obligation,
either with the original or a new lender, prior to filing its bankruptcy
case, but the lender neglects to perfect its new interest in (and often to
file a release the old lien on) the collateral until the 30-day grace period
in § 547(e)(2)(a) has expired. 299 Under the logic employed above for
delineating the scope of the earmarking doctrine in the more conventional setting of a new loan, this scenario might have been thought
as similarly ripe for reform. 300 However, application of the earmarking
298. A more-or-less bullet-proof defense might incline the old creditor to accept the payment and move on as opposed to initiate aggressive collection activity against the debtor in
order to get ahead of the beginning of the preference period. See supra text accompanying
note 64.
299. Section 547(e) governs when the transfer of a security interest in personal property
or a lien on real estate is deemed to take place. The possibilities are that the transfer occurs
when it was made or when it is perfected (made known publicly). Because the law frowns on
so-called "secret liens," the time of perfection is generally treated as the time of transfer, but
subject to a grace period during which perfection will be regarded as relating back to the
date the interest was granted. Since the effective date of BAPCPA, that grace period is thirty
days. Earlier, it had been only ten days. See 11 U.S.C § 547(e)(2) (2006).
300. In certain situations where the peculiar circumstances of the case mirror the
acknowledged rationales for the earmarking doctrine, some courts provide protection from
preferential avoidance in connection with asset sales transactions as well as new loans. See
Cage v. Wyo-Ben, Inc. (In re Ramba, Inc.), 437 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2006), involved a preference
challenge to certain transfers by the buyer of the debtor's drilling operations division of a
portion of the purchase price to unsecured creditors of the debtor which, under the purchase
agreement, were being assumed by the buyer. The court concluded the payments were not
preferential, since debtor's assets were fully encumbered at time of sale, meaning that the
funds would never have been available to general creditors in the bankruptcy case. Id. at
460. Specifically, as part of and essential to the sale to the buyer, the secured lender agreed
to release its security interests in the assets of the drilling division and to allow some of the
purchase price to go toward paying the debtor's liability to certain critical suppliers upon
which the drilling operations depended. In the ordinary case, when a third party pays a
creditor of an insolvent debtor with a portion of the purchase price for the debtor's assets,
the payment will be recoverable as a preference because of the loss of those funds for general
creditors. Buckley v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (In re Interior Wood Prods. Co.), 986 F.2d 228, 232 (8th
Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply the earmarking doctrine in a purchase and sale of assets situation). "On the other hand, if the funds used to pay the creditor were not part of the sale price
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principle in this context is problematic, primarily due to the tightening
in recent years of the bankruptcy courts' equitable powers,'30' even
when transfer of the security interest is made in return for new
value.302 In addition, affording relief from the rules governing when
the transfer of a collateral interest in the debtor's property is deemed
to occur would also violate the commercial law's opprobrium for "secret
liens" that § 547(e)(2) of the Code is intended to operationalize by
limiting the time an unrecorded lien can be effective. 303
The decision of the bankruptcy court in In re Power30 4 is illustrative.
The debtors in the case originally financed a vehicle through the Idaho
Central Credit Union ("ICCU"), secured by a lien on the vehicle.3 05 In
April of 2016, the debtors decided to refinance the purchase-money
loan with the proceeds of a new loan from the defendant, granting
the defendant a lien on the same vehicle. 06 However, due to a mistake
in the title application, the defendant's lien was not noted on the
certificate of title until May 20, a full 37 days after the debtors'
execution of the promissory note to the defendant.3 07
The debtors then filed their Chapter 7 bankruptcy case on July 18,
and the trustee in the case promptly initiated an action seeking to
set aside the defendant's lien on the vehicle as a preference under
§ 547(b). 308 Specifically, the trustee urged that because perfection of
the defendant's security interest did not occur until after the 30-day
safe harbor in § 547(e)(2) had expired, the transfer of the interest in

for the debtor's assets, then it is unlikely that the payment diminished the debtor's estate."
Warsco v. Preferred Tech. Grp., 258 F.3d 557, 565 (7th Cir. 2001). Finally, some courts just
seem to be much stricter in terms of requiring a new lender as a necessary condition before
even entertaining an earmarking argument. See supra note 279 and infra note 312.
301. See supra Section IV.
302. See Carlson, supra note 7, at 247 n.145.
303. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV.
725, 768-77 (1984) (describing the role of the preference law in addressing the problem of
ostensible ownership). The evils of ostensible ownership (secret liens) are frequently promoted as the justification for the perfection requirements of Article 9. See Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership:An Examinationof the Scope of Article 9,
35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 191-93 (1983).
304. Rainsdon v. Am. First Fed. Credit Union (In re Power), 2017 WL 4158329, Adv.
Proceeding No. 16-8034-JDP (Bankr. D. Id. Sept. 18, 2017).
305. Id. at *1.
306. Id. at *1-2. The defendant paid off ICCU, which then released its lien on the vehicle.
Id.
307. Id. at *4. Under Idaho law, a security interest in a motor vehicle is treated as perfected on the date that the state department of transportation receives a properly completed
application. There was some lack of clarity on the facts as to when the application was submitted, but the most favorable of the possibilities from the creditor's perspective was thirtyseven days after the date that the interest was granted. Id.
308. Id. at *4.
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the debtor's property occurred, at the earliest, on May 20, when the
properly completed application of a new certificate of title was received
by the Idaho Department of Transportation. 309 That being the case, the
trustee argued-not without some force-that the transfer was now
on account of an antecedent debt.3 10 The defendant did not dispute
the technical preference analysis but urged that the transfer of the
security interest to it should be insulated from avoidance based upon
the earmarking doctrine, pointing out that all that had occurred was
that a secured interest in the vehicle had been replaced by another
secured interest.31 1

While the defendant's position was also not without some weight,
the court rejected it for two reasons. First, the court found that
the earmarking doctrine is recognized to protect a transfer of funds
from a new creditor to an existing creditor," and the trustee in
the instant case was not challenging the payoff of ICCU by the
defendant. 3 Rather, in this case, the basis of the preference action
was the transfer by the debtor of a security interest to collateralize
the new loan that was not perfected within the safe harbor period
of § 547(e)(2)(A); i.e., thirty days. Thus, the transfer encumbered
property that had previously been unencumbered and, in so doing,
diminished the debtors' estate. 314 The second, and arguably more

309. Id. Ordinarily, renewal of an existing lien or security interest would not be "a new
transfer within the meaning of section 547 if it merely continues an existing interest; it does
not diminish the collection of assets to be distributed among the general creditors." Wind
Power Sys., Inc. v. Cannon Fin. Grp., Inc. (In re Wind Power Sys., Inc.), 841 F.2d 288, 292
(9th Cir. 1988); accord Gregory v. Cmty. Credit Co. (In re Biggers), 249 B.R. 873, 878 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000) (noting that a refinancing transaction is ordinarily not a preference). Of course,
this presumes that the debtor's property is continuously subject to the lien or security interest, which is what went wrong in In re Power, 2017 WL 4158329, at *6.
310. Under § 547(e)(1) of the Code, the transfer of a lien or security interest is deemed
to take place when it becomes effective between the parties, provided it is perfected within
thirty days of that time; if it is not so perfected, then it is deemed to occur upon the latter
perfection, creating a gap between attachment and perfection. See supra note 300. Effectively, ICCU's lien was released and, when the defendant tardily perfected its lien, the debtors' assets were diminished by the amount the lesser of the amount secured by the lien or
the value of the collateral.
311. In re Power, 2017 WL 4158329, at *7 (effectively trying to invoke the doctrine to
support the argument that, in substance, the defendant simply took over the ICCU lien, such

that the one secured creditor was substituted by another); see supra note 279.
312. Id. at * 8; see also Stingley v. AlliedSignal, Inc. (In re Libby Int'l, Inc.), 247 B.R. 463,
469 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the earmarking doctrine does not apply when there
is no new creditor substituted for an old creditor).
313. See also Buchwald Cap. Advisors v. Metl-Span I, Ltd. (In re Pameco Corp.), 356 B.R.
327, 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (refusing to apply the earmarking doctrine in situations
where the funds used to pay the old creditor were simply payments of sums due to the debtor
rather than newly borrowed funds). But see infra note 340 and accompanying text.
314. Power, 2017 WL 4158329, at *8.
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compelling, justification for the court's holding was that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to protect the transfer under these
circumstances. 31 1 Specifically, the court allowed that of all of the
decisions addressing application of earmarking logic to the security
interest of a new creditor, only the Eight Circuit has ruled that
the earmarking doctrine can be invoked to insulate the otherwise
avoidable transfer of a security interest to a new lender from
preference liability. 316
In response to that perspective, the Power court cited approvingly
from the First Circuit's opinion in In re Lazarus,31 " a case involving
comparable facts in which the circuit court reasoned that the
earmarking doctrine cannot provide the new creditor "an escape
from the plain language of section 547(b) in the case of a belatedlyperfected transfer of a security interest."13 1 This position appears to be
unassailable, as § 547(e) is quite explicit in relation to the time of
transfer, which is to say that if the creditor's interest in property is
not perfected within the statutory grace period then the transfer
is deemed to occur at the later time of perfection. 319 This means that
it does not relate back to the time the security interest attached
(i.e., become effective between the parties) and, thus, must be regarded
as on account of an antecedent debt. For this reason, if the other
elements of § 547(b) were satisfied as of this date, the transfer properly
qualifies as a voidable preference. To rule otherwise based on equitable
considerations would contravene the instruction of the Supreme

315. Id. at *5 (citing Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 420 (2014) for the proposition that the
court may not unilaterally extend the 30-day period of § 547(e)(2), "or otherwise adjust the
rights of the parties based upon its own sense of justice").
316. Id. at *7 (referring to Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F.2d
1087 (8th Cir. 1998)), discussed further infra text accompanying notes 323-24.
317. Collins v. Greater Atlantic Mort. Corp. (In re Lazarus), 478 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2007).
318. Id. at 16. To use the earmarking doctrine as a means for indefinitely extending the
30-day grace period in § 547(e) would undermine the balance struck by Congress between
allowing secured creditors a reasonable time to record and the policy of protecting other
creditors against "secret" liens, which is served by perfection. As it is, the argument has been
made that thirty days is already far more than is reasonably necessary. See CHARLES JORDAN

TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 6.9, p. 497 (4th ed., West 2016).
319. See Chase Manhattan Mort. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 468-72 (6th
Cir. 2008) (refusing to apply the earmarking doctrine to save a late-filed mortgage from
avoidance as a preferential transfer and noting that the multiple transfer approach adopted
in Lazarus represents the overwhelming weight of authority); see also Collins v. JP Morgan

Chase (In re Flannery), 513 B.R. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2014) (rejecting an attempt to apply
the earmarking doctrine to defend against trustee's effort to avoid a belatedly filed mortgage
as a preference); Gold v. Interstate Fin. Corp. (In re Schmiel), 319 B.R. 520, 528-29 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2005) (holding that the earmarking doctrine, if applicable in connection with
home mortgage refinancing transaction involving a belatedly perfected mortgage perfected,
would protect only the old mortgagee, the recipient of earmarked funds, and not new lender).
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Court in Law v. Siegel320 that the bankruptcy court's equitable
authority does not extend to construing an explicit statutory provision
beyond its logical limits.
The decision of the court in Power is unquestionably correct and
represents the strong weight of authority. 321 The Eighth Circuit's
decision in In re Heitkamp,32 2 which essentially sought to collapse all
of the stages of the refinancing arrangement into a single, or unitary,
transaction,32 3 has been properly criticized because it ignores the
statutory language relating to the definition of "transfer" in § 101(54),
as supplemented by § 547(e) governing the time of transfer of a
security interest. 2 4 These provisions together dictate that the failure
to perfect a security interest or record a lien against real estate within
thirty days after the date the security interest or lien became effective
between the debtor and the lender render the transfer on account of
an antecedent debt for preference analysis purposes.3 2 The argument
that the steps involved in a situation of this ilk should be regarded as
a "unitary transaction," and thus one not entailing a diminution of the
estate, disregards the Code's explicit scheme for determining when the
transfer of an interest in the debtor's property shall be deemed to
occur.3 26 Despite the appeal of the argument that other creditors were
320. Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014); Lee, 530 F.3d at 472 (applying the earmarking
doctrine in this scenario would "write § 547(e) out of the Bankruptcy Code and, in the process, defeat the sound policy the statute was intended to promote--the discouragement of
secret liens."); see also Rainsdon v. Am. First Fed. Credit Union (In re Power), 2017 WL
4158329, at *5, Adv. Proceeding No. 16-8034-JDP (Bankr. D. Id. Sept. 18, 2017). (noting
that the defendant's equitable argument to avoid avoidance of its lien was foreclosed by the
Supreme Court's holding in Law); see also Encore Credit Corp. v. Lim, 373 BR 7, 17 (E.D.
Mich. 2007 ) ("The safe harbor provision would be meaningless if a secured creditor could
perfect its interest at any time and still be able to use the earmarking doctrine.").
321. See Lee, 530 F.3d at 468 (identifying Lazarus, 478 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2007) as the
"prevailing" view) (citations omitted).
322. Kaler v. Cmty. First Nat'l Bank (In re Heitkamp), 137 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998);
accord Krigel v. Sterling Nat'l Bank (In re Ward), 230 B.R. 115 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999).
323. Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089 (finding no diminishment since one secured creditor
was simply replaced by another).
324. See supra note 321. But see Kevin M. Baum, Apparently, "No Good Deed Goes Unpunished": The Earmarking Doctrine, Equitable Subordination, and Inquiry Notice are Necessary Protections When Refinancing Consumer Mortgages in an Uncertain Market, 83 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1361, 1376-91 (2009) (arguing in favor of the appropriateness of the single
transfer, or unitary approach, endorsed by the court in Heitkamp).

325. See Chase Manhattan Mort. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 472 n.11
(6th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing cases where the new lien is perfected inside of the statutory
grace period); see also supra note 310.
326. See Lee, 530 F.3d at 473 (discussing "[t]he problems that arise when courts effectively rewrite bankruptcy statutes"). Part of the rationale in Heitkamp, 137 F.3d at 1089,
was to focus on the net effect of the transactions in question and not simply the form they
took, which is in part the justification for the expansive view of the earmarking doctrine
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not only not misled, 3 2 7 but perhaps even advantaged by the refinancing
transaction due to a lower rate of interest charged on the new secured
obligation, 328 resort to the earmarking defense to defeat a preference
challenge in this situation simply cannot be sustained under Code
policy or the current state of the Supreme Court's bankruptcy
jurisprudence.39
A similar abortive attempt to expand the earmarking doctrine so as
to protect a lender from its own carelessness, in spite of clear Code
authority detailing the consequences of such negligence, can be found
in In re Motors Liquidation Co., 3 30 a non-prototypical earmarking case
staggering on its facts simply because of the amount of money put in
peril by a neglectful mistake. What happened was that General Motors
pre-bankruptcy lenders had two credits outstanding to GM: a $300,000
lease financing obligation and a 1.5 billion term loan."' As part of a
prearranged plan, prior to filing its Chapter 11 petition, GM paid off
the $300,000 debt, but the lawyers for the banks' agent mistakenly
filed documentation purporting to release the banks' "main lien"
securing the $1.5 billion loan as well as the smaller loan.332
After the GM Chapter 11 case was filed, the unsecured creditors'
committee realized what had transpired and sought to have the
banks' loan declared unsecured because of the lapse in the continuous
perfection of the banks' security interest.3 3 3 The bankruptcy court
ruled in favor of the banks based on the fact that release of the lien on

advanced in this treatment. There is some appeal to that argument. The difference, however,
is the existence of an unequivocal statutory mandate. Thus, I have more sympathy for the
argument that the transfer of a belatedly perfected lien in connection with a refinancing
transaction does not involve earmarked property. Lee, 530 F.3d at 471.
327. In Lee, the new lender argued that, because discharge of the old lien did not occur
until after the new mortgage was recorded, third parties were at all times on notice that the
property was encumbered. However, the court declared that fact as "beside the point." 530
F.3d at 466.
328. The fact that no one was misled, and that the new loan reduced the interest rate
the debtor was paying by two percent so that the debtor "could perhaps pay his debts," was
the basis of Judge Merritt's dissent in Lee. 530 F.3d at 474-75 (Merritt, J., dissenting). These
points are quite fair, but the fly in the ointment is the clear statutory authority. See supra
note 332.
329. Supra note 321.
330. Motors Liquidation Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 596 B.R. 774 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2019).
331. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 777 F.3d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2015).
332. Motors Liquidation, 596 B.R. at 777.
333. Id. at 778.
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334
the term loan was not what the parties intended. The Second Circuit
reversed on the ground that the filing of the termination statement
was, even though unintended, authorized and, therefore, effective
according to its terms." The case was then remanded to the bankruptcy court to determine if the banks remained secured and to what
extent absent the main lien. 3 36 It was at this juncture that the banks
raised the earmarking argument.
Specifically, the banks urged that because the debtor-in-possession
financing from the U.S. and Canada was intended to pay off their $1.5
billion loan, they had a defense to the committee's action to set aside
7
their lien based on the earmarking doctrine. 3 The bankruptcy court
acknowledged that there was no circuit authority recognizing the
3 38
but added that
earmarking doctrine in this particular context,
factual
different
very
with
in
cases
"[e]xisting case law, developed
necessarily
not
does
circumstances than those presented here,
339
The court
prescribe all of the limits for application of the doctrine."
heeded, however, that, even if the doctrine might be invoked in this
type of situation, it was inapposite on the facts of this case because
there was no clear obligation to use the debtor-in-possession ("DIP").
340
financing to pay the lenders on the term loan. Moreover, insulating
the banks' lien from avoidance would result in a diminishment of the
estate, inasmuch as an unsecured loan (the banks' loan) would be

334. Id.; see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 486 B.R. 596, 647-48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2013).
335. Motors Liquidation , 777 F.3d at 105-06 (2d Cir. 2015).
336. Id.
337. Motors Liquidation, 596 B.R. at 780-81. The order approving the debtor-in-possession financing provided for pay-off of the $1.5 billion term loan, but also contained a proviso
that allowed the Committee to seek to claw back that repayment if the court determined that
the lenders were not properly secured. Id. at 779.
338. Id. at 781; cf. Carlson & Widen, supra note 88, at 602 n.63, maintaining that the
earmarking concept simply does not fit in this context, and most courts agree. See generally
Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2007), discussed
supra notes 325-28.
339. Motors Liquidation, 596 B.R. at 781. In this sense, the court was more receptive
than the Power court to recognizing the earmarking doctrine beyond the traditional scenario
of a new lender advancing funds to retire an old debt. See supra note 300 and text accompanying note 312; see also Campbell v. Hanover Ins. Co. (In re ESA Envt'l Specialists, Inc.),
709 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 2013) ('"The earmarking doctrine applies only when the debtor
borrows money from one creditor and the terms of that agreement require the debtor to use
the loan proceeds to extinguish specific, designated, existing debt.")
340. Motors Liquidation, 596 B.R. at 782-84 ("It would be a perversion of the equitable
earmarking doctrine to apply it in the circumstances of this case absent a clear statement in
the Final DIP Order preserving the earmarking defense when DIP Loan proceeds were used
to repay the Term Lenders subject to an express challenge provision.").
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replaced with a secured loan (the DIP financing). 341 In sum, the court
concluded that the banks' error in releasing the lien "should not be
rewarded now by applying a judge-made equitable doctrine that has
never been applied in circumstances such as those presented here." 342
By contrast with the situations in Power and Motors Liquidation,
when the earmarking doctrine is applied to shield a payment made
with unsecured borrowed funds that were designated or intended
for that purpose, there is no conflict with the terms of statute.3 3 Thus,
the doctrine falls within the ambit of the bankruptcy courts' power to
interpret Code provisions consistent with legislative intent. 4 4 This
is why courts that reject the earmarking doctrine in connection with
late-perfected refinancing transactions have no difficulty in allowing
it to be invoked in an effort to defeat the threshold requirements of
§ 547(b) in cases where the transaction entails a prearranged and
intentional use of new loan proceeds to retire an old debt. The
issue boils down to the question of how broadly, and under what
circumstances, the doctrine can and should be applied; those are the
questions this Article has attempted to address.
VIII. CONCLUSION

By definition, a preference involves the transfer of the debtor's
property or of an interest therein. Simply stated, if the property
transferred did not, in substance, belong to the debtor, then that
debtor's creditors cannot rightfully be said to have been injured by the
transfer. The earmarking doctrine is a means by which a preferential
challenge that, in terms of actual economic substance, involves the
transfer of third-party funds can be defeated on the basis that it
did not disadvantage other creditors or interfere with the policy of
ratable distribution. As a judicially-created equitable exception to
the preference provisions of section 547(b), the determination of
341. Motors Liquidation, 596 B.R. at 785-86 ("The earmarking doctrine will only protect
a transfer from avoidance to the extent it did not diminish the debtor's estate.") (citing Cadle
Co., D.A.N. Joint Venture, L.P. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan), 503 F.3d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 2007)).
342. Motors Liquidation, 596 B.R. at 787-88 (refusing to apply a judge-made doctrine to
undermine equality of distribution, "one of the most fundamental tenets of bankruptcy law.")
(citing Beiger v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)).
343. See Flanagan, 503 F.3d at 184 ("The earmarking doctrine 'applies where a third
party lends money to the debtor for the specific purpose of paying a selected creditor.' ")
(citing Glinka v. Bank of Vt. (In re Kelton Motors, Inc.), 97 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1996)). This
is because the loan funds that were "earmarked" to pay a particular creditor effectively never
became part of the debtor's assets. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 30 ¶ 547.03(2)] [a]
("A widely accepted exception to section 547 holds that when a third person makes a loan to
a debtor specifically to enable that debtor to satisfy the claim of a designated creditor, the
proceeds never become part of the debtor's assets, and therefore no preference is created.").
344. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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what constitutes "an interest of the debtor in property" for purposes of
applying the doctrine does not necessarily have to coincide with the
345
understanding of "property of the estate" for purposes of § 541(a).
Even though this long-recognized exception to preference recovery
3 46
originally arose in a Supreme Court case involving a guarantor,
there was nothing about the holding in that case that could fairly be
read to limit its precedential tail to codebtors.347 The line of authorities
that urge confining the doctrine to codebtor cases do so based on
a faulty rationale 348 and one that overlooks potential inequity to
non-codebtor lenders. 34 9
Acceptance of a broader interpretation of the scope of the
earmarking doctrine does not, however, end the inquiry. Even among
the decisions that extend the earmarking exception to situations
where the new creditor is an unrelated third party that merely loans
new funds to the debtor for the purpose of enabling the debtor to
pay the old creditor, there is nothing approaching consensus over
the circumstances that might support application of the earmarking
defense. Actually, there is not even agreement over the number and
essential characteristics of the differing tests or standards that have
35 0
been employed over the years by courts addressing the question.
Finally, this disorder is amplified by the fact that, by and large,
the concepts underlying most of these tests either provide marginally
52
useful guidance3 5 1 or are internally discordant.
Given this muddled state of affairs, and guided by the twin goals of
protecting the value of the estate from diminishment and protecting
equality of distribution measured from 90 days prior to filing, this
Article has attempted to put forth a framework for defining the scope
of the earmarking doctrine that is relatively easy to apply, elevates
substance over form, and more closely conforms to the purpose
intended to be served by the preference law than the other standards
that have been articulated in case law under the Code to date.

345. See supra Section VI.C.
346. Nat'l Bank of Newport, N.Y. v. Nat'l Herkimer Cty. Bank of Little Falls, 225 U.S.
178 (1912), discussed supra text accompanying notes 67-77.
347. See supra note 153.
348. Supra Section V.A.
349. See supra note 37.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 191-202.
351. The lack of any consensus over what constitutes impermissible control represents a
good example of why many of the tests that have been employed are not overly helpful. See
supra note 203.
352. Supra text accompanying note 167.
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This standard requires that, in order to determine whether the
earmarking doctrine will shield a transfer from avoidance as a preference, a court must look at the entire transaction in order to distill
its substance, eschewing a purely mechanistic and formalistic
approach.35 3 It incorporates both the concepts of intent and control,
but also contains a bright-line test in relation to the latter to avoid
the inherent imprecision entailed in attempting to define control in
relation to possession, location, or authority over the funds; definitions
that lack coherence and, further, carry the risk of riding roughshod
over the actual effect of the transfer on the latter to-be-formed bankruptcy estate.
This approach, if endorsed, holds the potential to simultaneously
better implement the goals of the bankruptcy system and reduce
wasteful litigation over just whose money it is. More broadly, it would
perhaps also serve as a welcome first step in moving us toward a more
comprehensible and consistent understanding of the preference law
writ large; one that happens to coincide with the equality objectives
that should be the starting place for any more in-depth discussion of
why we have a preference law in the first place.

353. Cooper v. Centar Invs. (Asia), Ltd. (In re TriGem Am. Corp.), 431 B.R. 855, 862
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) ("In correctly evaluating earmarking cases, ... it is necessary to look
at the transactions as a whole.").

